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Politics or Principle? Zechariah Chafee and the Social 
Interest in Free Speech 
Charles L. Barzun∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The classic defense of free speech, long attributed to John 
Milton and the American Founders, has justified its protection on 
public grounds. Under this view, the First Amendment protects free 
speech to ensure the proper functioning of democratic self-
government by facilitating the spread of truth on important public 
matters.1 Over the past few decades, however, political and legal 
theorists have challenged this view, arguing instead that free 
expression is properly safeguarded for the sake of the individual.2 
These theorists have deployed various types of arguments—
philosophical, doctrinal, and historical—to support this 
interpretation of the First Amendment. 
The leading historical argument consists of a revisionist account 
of the origins of the democratic, public interest-based conception of 
 
 ∗ Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; J.D./M.A. University 
of Virginia; A.B. Harvard University. I would like to thank the following people for their 
helpful feedback and comments on this or earlier drafts: Ken Abraham, Vincent Blasi, Barry 
Cushman, Ariela Dubler, Elizabeth Emens, Cynthia Estlund, Richard Fallon, Charles Fried, 
Jack Goldsmith, Risa Goluboff, Mike Klarman, Clarisa Long, Julia Mahoney, Charles 
McCurdy, Allan Megill, Caleb Nelson, Robert O’Neil, and G. E. White. 
 1. See, e.g., VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 752–53 (2006) 
(quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948)); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 39 (2005); Owen M. Fiss, Free 
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The 
Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 121, 121 (Lee C. Bollinger 
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 
262 (1992). 
 2. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 236 (1992); John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision 
of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 51–52 (1996); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s 
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 
1109 (1993); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 
215 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 334, 334 (1991). 
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free speech.3 Whereas First Amendment scholars traditionally traced 
the democratic theory back to the time of the Founders and even to 
the English Civil War,4 the revisionists contend that it was instead an 
innovation of the Progressive era. Jurists and intellectuals in the first 
decades of the twentieth century invented a theory based on the 
“social interest” in free speech for a democracy in order that its 
constitutional protection would be compatible with Progressive 
political ideology. In so doing, these Progressives, particularly 
Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee (1885–1957), deliberately 
ignored a “conservative libertarian” tradition of legal thought that 
had actively promoted free speech as an essential component of 
individual autonomy. This revisionist historical account has been 
widely accepted by First Amendment theorists and historians alike.5 
Nevertheless, I believe it is mistaken. 
This Article is thus an effort to revise the revisionists. It makes 
two historical arguments—one negative and one positive. It first 
seeks to show that the revisionist account, which has been most 
articulately expounded by Professor Mark Graber in his book 
 
 3. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF 
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 6 (1991); see also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS 
FORGOTTEN YEARS 2–3 (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (1988). 
 5. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2004); Robert W. Gordon, 
The Constitution of Liberal Order at the Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 373, 386 (2003); Steven Helle, Whither the Public’s Right (Not) To Know? 
Milton, Malls, and Multicultural Speech, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1077, 1083–85; Steven J. 
Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of 
Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1302 (1998); H.N. Hirsch, Majoritarian Politics and the 
Punishment of Speech, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 217, 231–32 (2001); McGinnis, supra note 2, at 
51; Brian K. Pinaire, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: The Supreme Court 
and Political Speech in the Electoral Process, 17 J.L. & POL. 489, 501 n.41 (2001); L.A. Powe, 
Jr., Searching for the False Shout of “Fire,” 19 CONST. COMMENT. 345, 347 n.16 (2002); 
Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the 
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000); Richard W. Steele, Fear of the Mob and 
Faith in Government in Free Speech Discourse, 1919–1941, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 55, 56 
(1994); G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in 
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 316 (1996); Gregory P. Magarian, 
Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1425, 1429 (1992) (book review); Richard T. Pfohl, Note, Hague v. CIO and the Roots of 
Public Forum Doctrine: Translating Limits of Powers into Individual Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 533, 534 (1993) (citing David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. R. 1205, 1211, 1283–1303 (1983)). 
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Transforming Free Speech, is deeply flawed and insufficiently 
supported by the historical evidence. Specifically, I argue that the 
extent and influence of the autonomy-based rationale for free speech 
has been somewhat exaggerated and that in reality, most nineteenth-
century “conservative libertarians” paid only lip service to the topic. 
Furthermore, those who did discuss free speech in any depth justified 
its protection on public grounds. 
I then offer my own account of Zechariah Chafee’s contribution 
to modern free speech theory, focusing particularly on his famous 
1919 Harvard Law Review article, “Freedom of Speech in 
Wartime.”6 Whereas the revisionists characterize that article as a 
product of Chafee’s Progressive political ideology, I argue instead 
that Chafee is better understood as trying to resolve tensions in legal 
doctrine by analyzing more deeply the traditional conceptions of 
freedom of speech as they had functioned at common law. Although 
most scholars recognize that the democratic view has roots older 
than the twentieth century, insufficient attention has been paid to 
the way in which Chafee’s theory grew directly out of nineteenth-
century protections of speech in the private law of defamation. Thus, 
where the revisionists see a radical break, I suggest that there has 
been doctrinal continuity through jurisprudential change. I further 
suggest that the democratic theory Chafee articulated during World 
War I may have particular relevance today when the government has 
once again made controversial efforts to control speech during 
wartime. 
Part II of this Article briefly surveys the current theoretical 
debate between democratic and autonomy theorists of free speech. 
Part III summarizes the revisionist historical account as put forth by 
Professor Graber and then shows why his thesis that nineteenth-
century proponents of property rights were ardent advocates of free 
speech, despite its intuitive plausibility, does not ultimately withstand 
scrutiny. Parts IV and V together present my own view as to how 
and why Chafee developed his theory. Part IV suggests that the 
growth of equity jurisdiction in the years before World War I 
revealed free speech rights to be not derivative of property rights, as 
the revisionist account contends, but instead to be in theoretical and 
practical tension with them. Part V then argues that Chafee’s 
reference to the “social interest” of free speech is best understood as 
 
 6. 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919). 
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an effort to resolve this tension in legal thought and practice. Part VI 
explains why this historical debate matters today and suggests that it 
may tell us something important about the use of history in legal 
theory. Finally, Part VII contains a brief conclusion. 
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE: DEMOCRACY AND AUTONOMY 
A. The Democratic View 
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant view among 
jurists and scholars was that the First Amendment protected speech 
because democratic self-government required it.7 According to this 
view, free speech facilitates the discovery and diffusion of truth on 
matters of public concern necessary to maintain a well-informed 
citizenry.8 This justification, which has been variously labeled, among 
other things, “functional,”9 “collectivist,”10 and “progressivist,”11 is 
well expressed by the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated declaration of 
this country’s “profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.”12 
The view has been dubbed “progressivist” because it seems to 
reflect a faith in the democratic process and in scientific advance 
characteristic of Progressive intellectuals of that era.13 Harvard Law 
Professor Zechariah Chafee, who has been called the “seminal figure 
in the development of the modern constitutional defense of free 
 
 7. See BLASI, supra note 1, at 832. 
 8. This characterization actually fuses two related but distinct theories of free speech: 
one bases its protection on its value purely for self-government, whereas the other does so for 
the sake of the “discovery of truth.” See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From 
Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 1, at 60 (distinguishing 
between the two rationales). The two theories are distinct, but the difference between them 
should not be overstated since the discovery of truth on religious, scientific, or social matters is 
frequently relevant to political debates and, therefore, self-government. 
 9. Hirsch, supra note 5, at 231. 
 10. Post, supra note 2, at 1109. 
 11. Balkin, supra note 5, at 29. 
 12. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. 
CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (praising the Court’s analysis in New York Times and quoting 
Alexander Meiklejohn as declaring the decision “an occasion for dancing in the streets”). 
 13. Balkin, supra note 5, at 29. 
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speech,”14 was perhaps the most influential proponent of this view at 
the time. According to Professor David Rabban, one of the leading 
historians of the First Amendment, Chafee’s 1919 Harvard Law 
Review article, “Freedom of Speech in Wartime,” was the “the key 
document” in the Progressives’ effort to advance the cause of 
freedom of speech and soon became “the starting point for analyzing 
the meaning and history of the First Amendment.”15 
In that article, Chafee set out to “ascertain the nature and scope 
of the policy which finds expression in the First Amendment” and in 
kindred state constitutional provisions.16 He sought in particular to 
“determine the place of that policy in the conduct of war, and 
particularly the war with Germany.”17 In order to discover the First 
Amendment’s meaning and scope, Chafee looked to its history and 
to the “purpose free speech serves in social and political life.”18 
Chafee’s historical account, which argues that the First Amendment 
was intended to outlaw the law of seditious libel, has been subjected 
to much historical argument pro and con.19 But the significance of 
that debate is limited for our purposes because Chafee denied that 
the intent of the Founders disposed of the matter, insisting that “the 
meaning of the First Amendment did not crystallize in 1791.”20 
Rather, according to Chafee, legal terms changed their meaning 
with time and had various influences.21 In addition to reflecting 
 
 14. GRABER, supra note 3, at 122. Professor Graber documents contemporary praise of 
Chafee, including Justice Frankfurter’s declaration that Chafee’s influence on civil rights “has 
no match in the legal professorate.” Id. (citing Felix Frankfurter, A Legal Triptych, 74 HARV. 
L. REV. 433, 440 (1961)); see also Jerold S. Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian: Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr. and Freedom of Speech, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 511, 531 (1969) (quoting Arthur Garfield 
Hays as describing Chafee’s Freedom of Speech as “a Bible on civil liberties questions”). 
 15. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 16. Chafee, supra note 6, at 935. 
 17. Id. Chafee had in mind the 1917 Espionage Act and the convictions recently upheld 
under it by the Supreme Court. Id.; see Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 18. Chafee, supra note 6, at 945. 
 19. The controversy began in 1960 when Professor Levy attacked Chafee’s account as 
historically inaccurate. See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 2–3 (1960); see also 
RABBAN, supra note 3, at 6 (noting the widespread acceptance of Chafee’s interpretation until 
the publication of Legacy of Suppression). 
 20. Chafee, supra note 6, at 954. 
 21. Id.; see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 
VA. L. REV. 485, 521–22 (2002) (explaining that such a view was new in the Progressive era 
and depended on a modern conception of history as “a continuous process of qualitative 
change” in opposition to the pre-modern view of history as the unfolding of eternal laws). 
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“men’s bitter experiences of the censorship and sedition prosecutions 
before 1791,” the First Amendment drew from two further sources: 
“the development of the law of fair comment in civil defamation and 
the philosophical speculations of John Stuart Mill.”22 With these 
influences in mind, Chafee concluded that “[o]ne of the most 
important purposes of society and government is the discovery and 
spread of truth on subjects of general concern” and that “[t]he First 
Amendment gives binding force to this principle of political 
wisdom.”23 In other words, the First Amendment served a public 
purpose, viz., the “interest in the attainment of truth, so that the 
country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it 
out in the wisest way.”24 
The same year that Chafee’s article was published, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes famously declared in his dissent in Abrams v. 
United States that the “theory of our Constitution” was that “the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas” and 
“that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.”25 Both Chafee and 
Holmes stressed the need to protect free speech not as a matter of 
natural individual right, but rather because it was instrumentally 
valuable in the practice of self-government and the discovery of 
truth. For Chafee, the principle of free speech flowed from the fact 
that in America the government was considered to be the servant, 
not the master, of the people.26 
This instrumentalist, democratic view of the First Amendment 
has remained prominent in the writings of scholars and in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Most famously, the philosopher 
Alexander Meiklejohn, in Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government, characterized the First Amendment as functionally 
analogous to the procedural rules governing a fair and effective town 
meeting.27 According to Meiklejohn, although such rules often 
restrict speech—for example, by permitting only those “recognized 
by the chair” to speak at any one time—they do so for the purpose 
of ensuring that “no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing 
 
 22. Chafee, supra note 6, at 955. 
 23. Id. at 956–57. 
 24. Id. at 958. 
 25. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 26. Chafee, supra note 6, at 947. 
 27. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 752–53. 
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because it is on one side of the issue rather than another.”28 
Meiklejohn thus distinguished the First Amendment’s protection of 
speech from that provided by the Fifth Amendment, which 
safeguards “the right to speak one’s mind as one chooses,” or the 
“private right of speech.”29 Such protection, though important, was 
“radically different in intent from the unlimited guarantee of the 
freedom of public discussion, which is given by the First 
Amendment.”30 
More recently, Cass Sunstein has advocated a “New Deal for 
speech,” whereby courts would recognize that even in the domain of 
speech, individual rights are creatures of the state and thus 
susceptible to legitimate government regulation.31 Sunstein argues 
that “the First Amendment is best understood by reference to the 
democratic process” and that “[t]he overriding goal of the 
amendment, rightly perceived, is to protect politics from 
government.”32 Thus, in the context of governmental regulation of 
media ownership, “[t]his vision of the First Amendment does not 
stress the autonomy of broadcasters with current ownership rights. 
Instead it emphasizes the need to promote democratic self-
government by ensuring that people are presented with a broad 
diversity of views about public issues.”33 
At the same time, the Supreme Court continues to see the 
democratic theory as an important justification for the First 
Amendment’s protection of free speech. In striking down a statute 
that prohibited the intentional or knowing disclosure of the contents 
of illegally-intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication, as 
applied to a radio station’s broadcast of threats made by a teacher’s 
union leader, the Court concluded that “[i]n these cases, privacy 
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance.”34 Justice Breyer in particular has been 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 754. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 263, 267; see also Posner, supra note 1, at 120–52 
(defending and formalizing an instrumental conception of free speech and tracing its roots to 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent). 
 32. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 262. 
 33. Id. at 276. 
 34. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the 
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of 
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a vocal proponent of this interpretation. In his recent book, Active 
Liberty, he emphasizes that one ought to read the First Amendment 
“not in isolation but as seeking to maintain a system of free 
expression designed to further a basic constitutional purpose: 
creating and maintaining democratic decision-making institutions.”35 
These views of the First Amendment are hardly homogeneous. 
To the contrary, there remain deep disagreements among theorists in 
this tradition as to whether the First Amendment primarily protects 
truth-seeking, self-government, or checking governmental abuse of 
power.36 Still, they do share common features; all view the protection 
of speech as instrumentally valuable to serve certain political 
purposes, and those purposes are public ones of particular 
importance in a democratic society. For that reason, adjudicating free 
speech disputes under this model also frequently requires that judges 
balance competing values.37 Finally, these theories tend to treat 
political speech as the paradigmatic form of expression deserving 
constitutional protection.38 
B. Autonomy Theories 
Over the last few decades, however, this view has come under 
attack. Many theorists, often seeking to expand the category of 
protected speech, have argued that free expression must be protected 
because proper respect for individual autonomy demands it, not 
because doing so instrumentally serves the common good. As with 
the democratic view, autonomy theories vary considerably,39 but the 
 
public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment . . . .” (quoting 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940))). 
 35. BREYER, supra note 1, at 39. 
 36. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1 
(arguing that Justice Holmes’s notion of a “marketplace of ideas” is better understood as 
highlighting the importance of character formation and checking governmental abuses of 
power than it does to either truth-seeking or self-government). 
 37. See Chafee, supra note 6, at 957 (“[T]here are individual interests and social 
interests, which must be balanced against each other, if they conflict . . . .”). 
 38. But see Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 
1699, 1704 (2005) (criticizing “the primacy of political speech” on the ground that under a 
true cost-benefit analysis, restrictions on commercial speech might sometimes cause more harm 
than those on political speech). 
 39. See sources cited supra note 2; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of 
Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875–76 (1993) (distinguishing between two quite different, and 
at times incompatible, conceptions of autonomy often employed by First Amendment 
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most important for our purposes are those that characterize free 
speech as a form of property right. 
Professor John McGinnis, for instance, has expressed concern 
that the “self-governance” theory of free speech affords only a 
“contingent liberty” based on the instrumental value of speech for 
the collective good.40 Professor McGinnis seeks to “cleanse the First 
Amendment of the obscuring varnish of social democracy and reveal 
its true origins as a property right of the individual, thus providing a 
model for an emerging laissez-faire jurisprudence.”41 Professor 
McGinnis argues that “since at the time of the Framing it was widely 
agreed that men’s liberty and property rights were one and the same, 
the right of free speech could be understood as intimately connected 
to the natural right of property.”42 Professor McGinnis seeks to 
reconceptualize the First Amendment as primarily about 
“prohibiting government interference with the individual’s right to 
transmit information and realize its use value.”43 In a similar vein, 
Professor Steven Heyman laments the rise of legal positivism and 
proposes returning to a “rights-based conception of the basis and 
limits of freedom of speech” that would draw on the natural rights 
tradition of Locke and “our modern understanding of fundamental 
rights.”
 44 
Professor Mark Graber also criticizes the traditional democratic 
model for insufficiently appreciating the “intimate constitutional 
relations between expression and economic rights.”45 But Professor 
Graber, unlike Professors McGinnis or Heyman, does not endorse a 
natural rights theory of the Constitution. To the contrary, he 
emphasizes the dependence of meaningful free speech on property in 
order to challenge the view—on which he believes the democratic 
model rests—that speech is a natural “input” of democracy and 
material resource allocation its “output.”46 Insofar as money is 
 
scholars). For a useful compilation of articles criticizing the traditional view, see BLASI, supra 
note 1, at 833–969. 
 40. McGinnis, supra note 2, at 59. 
 41. Id. at 56. Professor McGinnis traces this theory of the First Amendment back to 
James Madison “who deployed John Locke’s theory of property as the touchstone for his 
conceptualization of the First Amendment.” Id. at 64. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 71. 
 44. Heyman, supra note 5, at 1280. 
 45. GRABER, supra note 3, at 12. 
 46. Id. at 160. 
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equated with speech for the purposes of campaign finance, he 
contends, wealth is in reality as much an “input” of democracy as 
speech is. For Graber, this fact undermines the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment rationale for striking down regulations of 
campaign finance.47 
In criticizing the democratic view and in advocating autonomy-
based rationales of free speech, these and other scholars have 
employed various types of arguments. Some have based their theories 
of free speech on a priori philosophical principles.48 Others devote 
more attention to showing how notions of autonomy are reflected in 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.49 Still others 
make historical arguments. The next Part turns to the most 
influential of such historical arguments—that put forth by Professor 
Graber in his book Transforming Free Speech. 
III. THE “CONSERVATIVE LIBERTARIAN” TRADITION 
The traditional history of the First Amendment had long held 
that Zechariah Chafee, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and 
others rediscovered a “worthy tradition” of free speech that could be 
traced all the way back to seventeenth-century England.50 Professor 
Graber challenges this view, arguing instead that it is a twentieth-
century invention. Specifically, he contends that Chafee virtually 
single-handedly invented a theory based on the “social interest” in 
free speech in order to make its constitutional protection consistent 
with his own Progressive political views. In so doing, Chafee ignored 
a nineteenth-century “conservative libertarian”51 tradition of free 
speech, according to which it was protected not for its social benefits 
but for “the individual’s right of self-expression.”52 Graber thus seeks 
 
 47. Id. at 215. 
 48. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 2, at 231. 
 49. See, e.g., Post, supra note 2, at 1125–28; see also Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating 
Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1997) (defending the Supreme Court’s recent First 
Amendment decisions as properly reflecting an appreciation for a Kantian conception of human 
autonomy). 
 50. See KALVEN, supra note 4. 
 51. See infra Part III.B. These nineteenth-century theorists were libertarians insofar as 
they denied that the government had authority to interfere with individual rights, but Graber 
calls them “conservative” because they were primarily concerned with protecting property 
rights. GRABER, supra note 3, at 18. 
 52. GRABER, supra note 3, at 9. 
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to expose the recent origin and historical contingency of the 
democratic theory of free speech Chafee bequeathed to us in the 
hopes that doing so will finally allow us to free ourselves of it.53 
Graber’s account has been well received among First 
Amendment scholars and historians,54 but this warm reception is not 
justified. The claim that late nineteenth-century “conservative 
libertarian” supporters of laissez-faire constitutionalism vigorously 
defended free speech is simply not supported by the evidence. Most 
of the conservative libertarians whom Professor Graber holds up as 
free speech champions hardly ever mentioned the subject at all. And 
those who did devote attention to the issue justified its protection as 
necessary for self-government rather than for the “personal benefits 
of self-expression.”55 Thus, this Part seeks to show that the now-
conventional view that Chafee invented his “social interest” theory 
of free speech whole-cloth and in the process disregarded a robust 
libertarian tradition of free speech is mistaken. 
A. Graber’s Transforming Free Speech 
In Transforming Free Speech, Graber impressively blends First 
Amendment history and theory in making three related but distinct 
arguments: (1) the contemporary democratic theory of free speech—
what he calls the “civil libertarian” view—fails to deal adequately 
with today’s most pressing threats to free speech; (2) our continued 
adherence to the democratic theory despite its present defects owes 
at least in part to our historical misconception that it has always been 
the primary justification for the protection of speech; and (3) 
Zechariah Chafee fostered this misconception by developing a theory 
based on the “social interest” in free speech while ignoring the then-
dominant view that it was protected for the sake of the individual. 
This Part seeks to show that Graber’s third argument fails, but it first 
seeks to make clear what role Graber’s historical argument plays in 
his larger account. 
Today we face a crisis in First Amendment jurisprudence, Graber 
explains, because our theoretical framework for thinking about free 
expression cannot effectively cope with the most significant threats to 
it. These threats consist not in government suppression of speech, 
 
 53. Id. at 15. 
 54. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 55. GRABER, supra note 3, at 77. 
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but rather in the grossly unequal access to the economic resources 
necessary to make meaningful speech possible in America.56 In its 
seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo,57 the Supreme Court first 
sought to determine the extent to which the First Amendment 
protects the spending of money in political campaigns. Since then, 
judges and scholars have framed the issue as to whether “money is 
speech.”58 If it is, “then government cannot remedy even the 
grossest inequalities in access to the marketplace of ideas.”59 If 
money is not speech, however, the power of officials to regulate 
private property seems virtually unlimited. “No other solution seems 
possible,” Graber suggests, “because the free-speech tradition 
assumes that all constitutional problems can be neatly classified as 
affecting either democratic processes or substantive policies.”60 Thus, 
the problem with current theory is that it requires distinguishing 
between the “inputs” of democracy (speech), which deserve 
constitutional protection, and the “outputs” of democracy 
(property), which deserve none at all.61 
In the last chapter of Transforming Free Speech, Graber begins to 
lay out a normative theory of free speech that rejects this distinction 
between speech and property. Drawing on the work of the political 
theorist Michael Walzer, Graber argues that since rhetorical skill and 
verbal persuasiveness are crucial democratic virtues, “expression 
rights are violated whenever legislatures attempt to alleviate the 
disparities that result when persons take advantage of their political 
talents in the marketplace of ideas.”62 He devotes the bulk of his 
book, however, to making an historical argument, the central thesis 
of which is that Zechariah Chafee was primarily responsible for 
effecting this unfortunate cleavage between property and speech. 
According to Graber, prior to Chafee’s writing, the most 
prominent advocates of free speech conceptualized it as a species of 
individual property right.63 These libertarian theorists, Graber 
 
 56. Id. at 14. 
 57. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 58. GRABER, supra note 3, at 13. For the Court’s most recent holding on the topic, see 
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 59. GRABER, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
 60. Id. at 14. 
 61. Id. at 160. 
 62. Id. at 230. 
 63. Id. at 17–49. 
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maintains, protected speech not for its democratic value but for “the 
individual’s right of self-expression.”64 The problem for Chafee was 
that they grounded their defense of free speech in a more general 
theory of property rights that also justified the judicial invalidation of 
economic regulations, such as maximum-hour and minimum-wage 
laws, which were core to the Progressive agenda. To avoid sacrificing 
such laws, Graber explains, Chafee “divorced free speech from . . . 
property” and “concocted” a new theory of free speech based on the 
“social interest” in its protection.65 In short, Chafee “transformed” 
free speech and did so for practical political reasons unconnected to 
free speech and of little relevance today.66 
B. The “Conservative Libertarian” Tradition 
In documenting this “conservative libertarian” tradition of free 
speech, according to which it was protected as an individual right 
analogous to property, Graber draws on the work of various late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal scholars, public 
intellectuals, and jurists. These include, among others, John Burgess, 
Thomas Cooley, Christopher Tiedeman, William Graham Sumner, 
Herbert Spencer, and Justices Harlan and Field. These conservative 
libertarians expressed a “commitment to individual freedom from 
state regulation,” Graber maintains, that inspired them “to recognize 
a sphere of private mental conduct that was as inviolate as their 
cherished sphere of private commercial conduct.”67 Graber further 
explains that for conservative libertarians, freedom of expression and 
property rights were inextricably tied together; for them, the 
government “had no more business regulating expression than it had 
regulating property.”68 
But the writings Graber draws upon do not bear out his thesis. 
As shown below, most of these conservative libertarians barely 
mentioned free speech at all. Furthermore, those who did take up 
the subject did not always hold particularly expansive conceptions of 
free speech; nor did they justify its protection on grounds of 
 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. Id. at 12. 
 66. Id. at 10. 
 67. Id. at 19. 
 68. Id. at 18. 
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individual autonomy.69 Rather, they stressed its value for democratic 
self-government, just as Chafee later would. Below, I scrutinize in 
detail the figures Graber relies on most, but the same criticisms apply 
to virtually all those he mentions. 
1. Legal scholars 
Graber introduces his chapter on the conservative libertarians 
with a 1923 quotation from John Burgess (1844–1931), a well-
known political scientist, whom Graber describes as the “last 
prominent survivor of an earlier conservative libertarian tradition.”70 
“No man,” Graber quotes Burgess as declaring, “who does not 
recognize the complete freedom of individual thought and 
expression, . . . possesses the most essential qualification for 
citizenship of the republic or any other real republic.”71 Graber relies 
on Burgess’s work extensively, because more than any other author, 
Burgess equated rights of free speech with those of property. 
The problem for Graber is that virtually all of Burgess’s 
discussions of the topic were written in 1923 or thereafter, well after 
Chafee first articulated his theory. He mentions only two instances in 
which Burgess discussed free speech prior to 1923. In the first, 
Burgess described a statute criminalizing criticism of the government 
as “an unusual law of libel and slander”72—hardly a damning 
condemnation. In the second, he simply listed freedom of speech 
among those rights protected by a general principle of individual 
liberty.73 Thus, Burgess may have demonstrated libertarian political 
theory to be useful in criticizing the Espionage Act—the same Act 
 
 69. I do not mean to suggest that no one defended speech on these grounds. Professor 
David Rabban documents a tradition of “libertarian radicals” who, during the decades prior to 
World War I, “produced a broad conception of free speech as an aspect of their underlying 
belief in individual autonomy.” RABBAN, supra note 3, at 24. These radicals were often 
activists for labor reform, women’s rights, and sexual freedom. Id. However, as Professor 
Rabban notes, they tended to come from the “intellectual and social fringes of American 
society” and thus did not represent mainstream legal thought at the time. Id. at 23. This Part 
challenges only the idea that the dominant view of free speech among legal scholars and more 
conventional public intellectuals defended free speech on autonomy grounds. 
 70. GRABER, supra note 3, at 17. 
 71. Id. (quoting JOHN W. BURGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 26 (1923)). 
 72. Id. at 249 n.112 (citing BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890)). 
 73. Id. at 19, 34 (citing BURGESS, supra note 71, at 86–87). 
BARZUN.MRO.DOC 4/5/2007 11:15:10 AM 
259] Social Interest in Free Speech 
 273 
that prompted Chafee’s writing—but it may be an exaggeration to 
say that he advocated free speech rights “for more than thirty 
years.”74 
Graber also frequently draws upon the work of Thomas Cooley 
(1824–1898), the prominent nineteenth-century constitutional 
authority and justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. As Graber 
acknowledges, Cooley and Burgess were the only theorists who 
treated the topic at any length.75 And Cooley was indeed an advocate 
of expansive constitutional protections of free speech. For instance, 
he proposed an expanded qualified privilege in defamation actions 
for criticism of public officers, advocating what later became the 
modern position—that liability may only attach if the plaintiff proved 
that the defendant made the statement knowing it to be false or with 
reckless disregard for its truth.76 Cooley’s construction of this 
privilege was broader than those of most courts at the time, and 
Graber makes much of this fact, often citing other writers’ 
endorsements of Cooley’s position as evidence of their 
libertarianism.77 
But although Cooley was a champion of individual property 
rights, he did not defend free speech on similarly individualistic 
grounds. Instead, he justified privileges for speech on public 
grounds. In criticizing a New York court’s rejection of such a 
privilege,78 he questioned whether “they have duly considered the 
importance of publicity and discussion on all matters of general 
concern in a representative government.”79 He cited as authority an 
English judge who had found a defense counsel’s argument for the 
privilege convincing: “He pressed upon us that, whenever the public 
had an interest in such a discussion, the law ought to protect it, and 
work out the public good by permitting public opinion.”80 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 24. 
 76. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 439 (Legal 
Classics ed. 1987) (1868). This rule was later adopted by the Supreme Court in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
 77. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 3, at 42–43 (“Black, Tiedeman, and Brewer specifically 
endorsed Cooley’s analysis of the law of libel.”). 
 78. Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827). 
 79. COOLEY, supra note 76, at 438. 
 80. Id. at 439 (citing Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W. 319 (1846)) (emphasis added). 
Graber asserts that Chafee “ignored” Cooley’s dissent in Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press, 9 N.W. 
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Cooley also limited the scope of the constitutional protections 
according to this public-interest justification. Since obscenity, 
blasphemy, and defamation of private individuals had no obvious 
connection to public issues on which citizens needed to form 
opinions, they were undeserving of protection.81 Nor did the 
constitutional provisions imply exemption from the police power of 
the state. Quite the opposite, immunity for publication was only 
guaranteed “so long as it [was] not harmful in its character, when 
tested by such standards as the law affords.”82 Graber is right to 
suggest that Cooley apparently thought the 1798 Sedition Act had 
violated the Constitution, but even Cooley’s criticism of that Act was 
not absolute. He explained that its “constitutionality was always 
disputed by a large party, and its impolicy was without question. Its 
direct tendency was to produce the very state of things it sought to 
repress.”83 Cooley thus concluded that seditious libel laws tended to 
produce more evil than they prevented and in any case were 
“unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of 
America.”84 In short, Cooley’s commitment to free speech was not 
unqualified, and in those areas where he did put forth expansive 
views of free speech, he did so for its public benefits. 
Graber finds even less support in Christopher Tiedeman (1857–
1903), who interpreted the First Amendment far more restrictively 
than did Cooley. Tiedeman wrote prolifically on constitutional law, 
and his influence was, in Graber’s view, “second only to Cooley’s.”85 
He wrote very little on free speech, however, devoting less than 6 of 
his 1096 pages of his monumental, two volume constitutional 
treatise to the topic (as compared with 378 pages on “Regulation of 
Trades and Occupations”).86 Graber emphasizes that Tiedeman 
included freedom of speech among the liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “on the general 
 
501 (Mich. 1881), GRABER, supra note 3, at 129, but in that decision, too, Cooley grounded 
his defense of liberal free speech protection in the public interest that a free press serves. 
Atkinson, 9 N.W. at 530. 
 81. COOLEY, supra note 76, at 422. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 427. 
 84. Id. at 429. 
 85. GRABER, supra note 3, at 34. 
 86. CHRISTOPHER GUSTAVUS TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STAND POINT 227–32, 234–612 (2d. ed. 1900). 
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ground that [it] would involve the deprivation of liberty and the 
right to pursue happiness.”87 But the view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates certain legal rights does not necessarily 
imply anything as to the substantive scope of those rights. One could 
thus consistently hold that the Due Process Clause incorporates a 
right to “freedom of speech” and, at the same time, hold a highly 
restrictive notion of what that phrase means. 
Such was precisely Tiedeman’s position. He began his chapter on 
the topic by declaring that even without the First Amendment, any 
state law infringing “the right of the individual to publish what he 
pleases” would be unconstitutional since such a right is included in a 
general right to individual liberty.88 However, he immediately 
qualified this principle: “[T]he liberty of speech and of the press is 
not to be confounded with a licentiousness and a reckless disregard 
of the rights of others.”89 For instance, the common law right to 
reputation offered a remedy against such licentiousness in the form 
of libel actions. Tiedeman even worried such a remedy was 
inadequate against an increasingly powerful press. He therefore 
argued that the sensationalized accounts of individuals’ indiscretions 
and “immoralities” frequently found in the press ought to be classed 
as obscene.90 “If possible,” Tiedeman argued, “the publication of 
such matter should be suppressed, or at least published in such a 
way, as to do little or no harm to the morals of the community.”91 
Tiedeman’s definition of free speech was thus fairly restrictive. 
Like Cooley, Tiedeman endorsed a privilege for criticism of 
officers and candidates for office, but he limited it in a way Cooley 
found objectionable. Cooley criticized the view that such a privilege 
should extend only to public conduct, finding the distinction 
between private character and public conduct to be unacceptable in 
the context of a public officer whose private character directly 
affected his conduct.92 Tiedeman, however, limited the privilege to 
 
 87. GRABER, supra note 3, at 34 (quoting CHRISTOPHER GUSTAVUS TIEDEMAN, A 
TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, CONSIDERED 
FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 189 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book 
Co. 1886)). 
 88. TIEDEMAN, supra note 87, at 189. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 190. 
 91. Id. 
 92. COOLEY, supra note 76, at 440. 
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communications regarding public conduct on the ground that “a 
candidate for office may possess defects of character, which cannot in 
any way affect the public welfare by influencing or controlling his 
official conduct.”93 
Moreover, Tiedeman retreated from Cooley’s call for a similar 
privilege for publishers of news. Cooley thought the common law 
ought to recognize that modern newspapers had become “one of the 
chief means for the education of the people” and that they could not 
always verify their sources in time for publication.94 The press should 
therefore not be held liable for good faith publications of false 
facts.95 But Tiedeman sought to limit this privilege as well. “[T]here 
is no reason,” he insisted, “why any special protection should be 
thrown around the publisher of news. Any such special protection 
which cannot in reason be extended to the ‘village gossiper,’ would 
in the main serve to protect newspaper publishers in the publication 
of what is strictly private scandal.”96 Finally, to the extent Tiedeman 
did condone certain types of privileged communications, he appears 
to have done so for their public benefit, not for the individual 
interest in self-expression. “The electors, and the public generally,” 
Tiedeman explained, “are interested in knowing the character and 
qualifications of those who apply for their suffrages.”97 
John Randolph Tucker (1823–1897) provides Graber with 
slightly better evidence of a true conservative libertarian defender of 
free speech. A law professor and five-term Congressman, Tucker 
hardly discussed the constitutional protection of free speech in his 
writing at all, devoting less than three pages to the subject in his 
874-page, two-volume treatise The Constitution of the United 
States.98 But in the case of Spies v. Illinois,99 Tucker represented 
before the Supreme Court several radicals who had been sentenced 
to death for their part in the Haymarket Square bombing.100 His 
 
 93. TIEDEMAN, supra note 87, at 47. 
 94. COOLEY, supra note 76, at 452, 454. 
 95. Id. at 451–57. 
 96. TIEDEMAN, supra note 87, at 54. 
 97. Id. at 58. 
 98. 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A 
CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 669–71 
(1899). 
 99. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). 
 100. GRABER, supra note 3, at 39. 
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brief did not rely substantially on a freedom of speech defense,101 but 
the fact that Tucker argued the anarchists’ case suggests at least some 
economic libertarians were indeed committed defenders of free 
speech. However, Tucker appears to have been the exception, not 
the rule. 
2. Public intellectuals 
Graber draws on the work of various late nineteenth-century 
public intellectuals but none provide much support for his thesis. He 
quotes the social theorist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) as praising 
“private activities and their spontaneous co-operation” for having 
“done more towards social development than those which have 
worked through governmental agencies.”102 Similarly, he notes that 
William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), another social critic, 
declared that “capital . . . emancipated slaves and serfs” and “set the 
mass of mankind free from the drudgery which . . . wears out the 
mind.”103 According to Graber, such comments show that 
conservative libertarians “perceived empirical relationships between 
economic policies and expression rights.”104 
But neither of these scholars said much about freedom of speech. 
Spencer did expound an unabashedly libertarian political theory that 
influenced later libertarian radicals, such as Theodore Schroeder.105 
But Spencer does not appear to have ever discussed freedom of speech 
as such or explained how his “law of equal freedom” would apply to 
it in practice. Although Spencer devoted whole chapters of his Social 
Statics to the right to property, the right to intellectual property, the 
 
 101. The brief primarily argued that the defendants had been denied common law rights 
of criminal procedure. See Spies, 123 U.S. at 132–34. 
 102. GRABER, supra note 3, at 18 (citing HERBERT SPENCER, MAN VERSUS THE STATE 
357–58 (1896)). 
 103. Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (citing WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, SOCIAL 
DARWINISM: SELECTED ESSAYS BY WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 145 (1963)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, TOGETHER WITH MAN VERSUS THE STATE 
55 (D. Appleton & Co. 1915) (1851); see, e.g., THEODORE SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR 
RADICALS 94 (1916) (endorsing Spencer’s “law of equal freedom” according to which “every 
man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any 
other man”). The term “libertarian radicals” comes from Professor Rabban. See RABBAN, supra 
note 3, at 2. 
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regulation of commerce, and the separation of church and state, he 
devoted not one to the issue of free speech.106 
The same is true of Sumner, who hardly ever addressed the topic. 
According to Graber, “[i]n a series of anti-imperialist articles, 
[Sumner] attacked ‘the doctrine that those who oppose a war are 
responsible for the lives lost in it, or that a citizen may criticize any 
action of his government except a war.’”107 Graber offers this as 
evidence of Sumner’s support for political dissidence, along with 
Sumner’s statement that “a democratic government . . . is excessive 
and pitiless against dissentients.”108 But the conclusion Graber draws 
from such passages—that “Sumner did not defend free speech 
because he wanted to attack the war; he attacked the war because he 
wanted to defend free speech”—finds no warrant in the text.109 
Sumner attacked imperialism because he believed it resulted in 
militaristic policies, which destroyed the rule of law. “Imperialism,” 
he wrote, “is the way of looking at things which is congenial to 
people who are ruling others without constitutional restraints.”110 
The First Amendment may have been one of the “constitutional 
restraints” Sumner had in mind, but he never mentioned it, nor did 
he ever indicate it was something to which he devoted much 
thought.111 For Sumner, “[t]he evil of imperialism is in its reaction 
on our own national character and institutions, on our political 
 
 106. SPENCER, supra note 105, at 62–65, 68–73, 137–44. Spencer did, however, note 
the importance of reputation and its protection by the law of equal freedom: “[T]hough 
another’s good character, when taken away, cannot be appropriated by the traducer, the taking 
of it away is still a breach of the law of equal freedom, in the same way that destroying 
another’s clothes, or setting fire to his house, is a breach.” HERBERT SPENCER, JUSTICE: 
BEING PART IV OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS 115 (1891). 
 107. GRABER, supra note 3, at 23 (citing WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, THE 
PREDOMINANT ISSUE 10 (1901)). 
 108. Id. at 27 (alteration in original) (citing WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL 
CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER 32 (1920)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. SUMNER, supra note 107, at 10. 
 111. Far more likely, Sumner was referring to constitutional restraints on the 
government’s taxation power. The scope of such power was a controversial issue at the time 
and was addressed by the Supreme Court in The Insular Cases. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 
U.S. 244 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico was a territory subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States for purposes of the revenue clauses of the United States Constitution); De Lima 
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (holding that in the absence of congressional legislation, the 
United States could not collect customs duties from Puerto Rico). I thank Michael Klarman 
for suggesting to me this interpretation of Sumner’s criticism. 
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ideas,” and on “our temper in political discussion.”112 But he hardly 
held wide-open political discussion in high esteem when he 
disfavored the view proposed. In warning of the redistributive threat 
of democracy, Sumner wrote that a democratic system “can no more 
admit to public discussion, as within the range of possible action, any 
schemes for coddling and helping wage-receivers than it could 
entertain schemes for restrictive political power to wage-payers.”113 
Indeed, Sumner’s commitment to laissez-faire capitalism resulted 
in a very narrow view of free speech protection. As we will see in Part 
IV, corporations at this time frequently sought injunctive relief from 
courts to prevent labor unions from holding boycotts. In these cases, 
the corporations argued that such boycotts threatened their property 
rights, while the unions often claimed that enjoining boycotts 
violated their freedom of speech. Not surprisingly, Sumner sided 
with the corporations on this issue: “The boycotted man is deprived 
of the peaceful enjoyment of rights which the laws and institutions of 
his country allow him, and he has no redress.”114 The only “rights” 
Sumner saw in such conflicts were the property rights of the 
corporation boycotted. 
Finally, Sumner openly rejected the doctrine of natural rights. 
Whereas Spencer believed that man’s “instinct of personal rights” 
justified their legal protection,115 Sumner denied the existence of 
natural rights.116 He recognized that “the notion of natural rights is 
one of great value and importance,” but he denied that anything 
“necessary to maintain [an] existence” was protected by one.117 
Instead, Sumner ultimately grounded his defense of limited 
government on the principle that people should be left free to fight 
in the perennial struggle for existence. As he put it, man “should be 
left free to do the most for himself that he can, and should be 
 
 112. SUMNER, supra note 107, at 11. 
 113. SUMNER, supra note 108, at 37. 
 114. SUMNER, supra note 103, at 107. 
 115. SPENCER, supra note 105, at 47–48. 
 116. SUMNER, supra note 103, at 116 (“There is a doctrine floating about in the 
literature that we are born to the inheritance of certain rights. That is another glorious dream, 
for it would mean that there was something in this world which we got for nothing.”). 
 117. Id. at 66. Sumner further mocked the logic such a doctrine entailed: “[E]very man 
has a natural right to succeed in the struggle for existence, or to be happy. It is the duty of the 
state to secure natural rights. Therefore, if there is anything which a man wants, he is entitled 
to have it so long as there is any of it.” Id. 
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guaranteed the exclusive enjoyment of all that he does.”118 In short, 
Sumner was so committed to Social Darwinism that for him liberty 
meant little more than non-interference with an individual’s efforts 
to acquire property in order to survive.119 If that was so, his 
justification likely did not extend to cover speech for the “personal 
benefit[] of self-expression,” at least insofar as such expression was 
not necessary for survival.120 
Graber’s effort to characterize Henry Adams (1838–1918) and 
E.L. Godkin (1831–1902), two prominent public intellectuals, as 
conservative libertarians encounters similar difficulties.121 The only 
evidence adduced to show that Adams was a free speech proponent 
comes from an article in Forum entitled “Shall We Muzzle the 
Anarchists?”122 Otherwise, Graber relies only on Adams’s support for 
“civil service and tariff reform” to justify labeling him a conservative 
libertarian.123 Perhaps more important, even in his Forum article, 
Adams ultimately argued for tolerance on pragmatic grounds. As 
Graber acknowledges, the point Adams urged was that legislation to 
suppress anarchists’ speech would simply create sympathy for 
them.124 
Neither did E.L. Godkin, the founder and editor of the Nation, 
defend free speech for the sake of individual self-expression. Instead, 
he thought it critical for democratic self-rule. Graber draws primarily 
from Godkin’s article entitled Suppression, in which Godkin 
expressed outrage over the McKinley Administration’s censorship of 
letters sent to soldiers stationed in the Philippines and its threat to 
curtail their publication.125 Godkin equated such censorship to the 
policies of “certain despotic countries like Russia and Turkey” and 
insisted that it contradicted the democratic assumptions on which 
this country was supposedly based: “Our Government, on the 
contrary, is based on the hypothesis that each man is as good a judge 
as any other man of what our legislation and administration should 
 
 118. SUMNER, supra note 108, at 35. 
 119. SUMNER, supra note 103, at 77. 
 120. GRABER, supra note 3, at 77. 
 121. Id. at 235 nn.3–4. 
 122. Id. at 19 (citing Henry Adams, Shall We Muzzle the Anarchists?, 1 FORUM 446–47 
(1886)). 
 123. Id. at 236 n.4. 
 124. Id. at 22. 
 125. Id. at 23 (citing E.L. Godkin, Suppression, 68 NATION 388 (1899)). 
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be. It is from this theory that universal suffrage derives its moral 
authority to make war . . . .”126 This justification seems to stress the 
value of free speech for its role in preserving democratic legitimacy 
rather than purely for its instrumental value in attaining truth on 
public matters, but in either case, Godkin clearly sought to protect 
speech for the benefit of the audience rather than the speaker. 
Interestingly, the central thesis of Godkin’s article makes this point 
clear. “Suppression” refers not to the administration’s policies, but 
rather to the self-censorship of the partisan presses, which rarely 
published facts or opinions inconsistent with their own narrowly 
partisan agenda. By publishing little of value to the citizen, the 
function of these newspapers was “mainly one of suppression.”127 
3. Supreme Court Justices 
Graber finds some evidence of a libertarian concern for free 
speech in Justice Harlan’s dissent in Patterson v. Colorado.128 In that 
case, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, dismissed an appeal 
from a contempt order issued by the Supreme Court of Colorado 
against the publisher of articles and cartoons “intended to embarrass 
the court.”129 In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. In response to the 
Court’s Blackstonian interpretation of the First Amendment, Harlan 
replied, “I cannot assent to that view, if it be meant that the 
legislature may impair or abridge the rights of a free press and of free 
speech whenever it thinks that the public welfare requires that to be 
done.”130 
But when discussing the “Four Horsemen,”131 Graber is less 
persuasive. He points out that of the nine free speech cases these 
Justices considered, they voted in favor of the claim in four of 
them.132 However, all of these cases occurred after Chafee had done 
his first writing on free speech and therefore could not have been 
 
 126. Godkin, supra note 125, at 388. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); GRABER, supra note 3, at 129. 
 129. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 463. 
 130. Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 131. The “Four Horsemen” were Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and 
Butler. These Justices were all conservative and often voted together in the 1930s. 
 132. GRABER, supra note 3, at 45. 
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“ignored” by him.133 Moreover, in three of them, the four 
conservative Justices joined unanimous decisions of the Court in 
cases presenting fairly egregious violations of free speech.134 In the 
fourth case, Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,135 the 
Horsemen dissented from the Court’s holding that the NLRB’s 
requirement that employers rehire employees fired for engaging in 
union activities and advocacy of collective bargaining was not 
unconstitutional as applied to the AP’s discharge of one of its 
editorial staff members.136 Justice Sutherland’s opinion did rely 
substantially on the First Amendment argument, but it is worth 
noting that this was a rare case in which the free speech argument 
was buttressed by—rather than in conflict with—freedom of contract 
arguments. Furthermore, as Graber acknowledges, this opinion gives 
a misleading impression of the views of Justice Sutherland, who 
during the Red Scare was hardly a zealous defender of free speech.137 
To sum up, the revisionist account’s persuasiveness owes more to 
its intuitive plausibility than to its empirical support. Because some of 
the conservative libertarians listed “freedom of speech” among the 
rights protected by a general theory of natural rights, at a high level 
of abstraction they appear libertarian on the issue. But as we have 
seen, these same thinkers often interpreted free speech narrowly 
when it seemed to conflict with another of their sacred rights—such 
as the property right in reputation or even the right of a community 
to protect its moral health.138 Moreover, most of these scholars and 
 
 133. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 134. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 357 (1937) (reversing the conviction under a 
state criminal syndicalism statute of a defendant who had attended a meeting of the 
Communist Party “at which nothing unlawful was done or advocated”); Grosjean v. Am. Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down a Louisiana tax on newspaper advertising revenue 
that only applied to newspapers with circulations of more than twenty thousand copies per 
week); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927) (reversing the conviction under a state 
criminal syndicalism statute of a defendant who had secured members to an organization 
whose constitution stated “[t]hat the working class and employing class have nothing in 
common, and that there can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among 
millions of working people,” even though there was no evidence that the organization 
advocated crime or violence to effect political change). 
 135. Associated Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
 136. Id. at 133–41 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 137. GRABER, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
 138. One of today’s leading conservative libertarians has criticized New York Times v. 
Sullivan for precisely this reason. Epstein argues that New York Times’ broad rule making 
defamation non-actionable went too far because it did not take into account an individual’s 
interests in their reputation. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 
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intellectuals gave scant attention to the topic of free speech, and 
those who did emphasized its democratic value, just as Chafee later 
would. Thus, the idea that in developing his theory, Chafee 
disregarded a “conservative libertarian” tradition of political and 
legal thinkers who expounded expansive conceptions of freedom of 
speech is not supported by the evidence. 
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE GROWTH OF EQUITY 
Still, a question persists. For it is true that in the late nineteenth 
century, property rights were paradigmatic of individual rights in 
general.139 One might therefore expect Chafee’s defense of free 
speech to be framed in such terms. And in his 1919 article, Chafee 
recognized that the First Amendment also protected an “individual 
interest,” which included the “need of many men to express their 
opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living.”140 Yet 
he focused more on the “social interest in the attainment of truth, so 
that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but 
carry it out in the wisest way.”141 Chafee did not deny that he did so 
in part for practical reasons. In wartime, many understandably felt 
obligated to sacrifice for the common good; but so long as free 
speech was framed as a purely individual interest, many would 
assume that it “must readily give way like other personal desires the 
moment it interferes with the social interest in national safety.”142 
Where, then, did Chafee’s talk of “social interests” come from? 
That Chafee invoked both the individual and the public benefits 
of free speech suggests that he used the term “social interest” not 
only to highlight its social value, but also to make clear that we 
protect speech for the interest it serves. “It is useless,” he maintained, 
“to define free speech by talk about rights.”143 Every assertion of 
right by one party is met with a counter-assertion by the other: 
 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 798 (1986) (“Reputation is not some lifeless abstraction, but the 
summation of all the possibilities for gainful interactions—economic, social and political—with 
others that are stripped away by false statements.”). 
 139. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 145 (1992). 
 140. Chafee, supra note 6, at 958. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 959. 
 143. Id. at 957. 
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The result is a deadlock. Each side takes the position of the man 
who was arrested for swinging his arms and hitting another in the 
nose, and asked the judge if he did not have a right to swing his 
arms in a free country. “Your right to swing your arms ends just 
where the other man’s nose begins.”144 
To get beyond this impasse, one had to look to the social and 
individual interests that such rights exist to protect. These interests 
must then be “balanced against each other, if they conflict, in order 
to determine which interest shall be sacrificed under the 
circumstances and which shall be protected and become the 
foundation of a legal right.”145 
Although Chafee’s meaning seems clear, his motivation for 
framing the issue as one of “interest balancing” is not. On one view, 
it reflects Chafee’s effort to fashion a theory of free speech 
compatible with political Progressivism. Professor Rabban writes that 
although “[w]ritten under the guise of scholarship,” Chafee’s 1919 
article “was essentially a work of propaganda.”146 Similarly, Professor 
Graber contends that Chafee “rejected the principles underlying the 
‘traditional’ conservative libertarian defense of expression rights 
because, although he sometimes pretended otherwise, he was a 
mainstream progressive who insisted that judges had no business 
protecting their idiosyncratic notions of individual rights.”147 
This ideological interpretation suffers from two principal defects. 
First, it seems inconsistent with Chafee’s personality and politics. 
Born into a wealthy and prominent Rhode Island family, Chafee’s 
political and intellectual temperament was moderate to conservative. 
His biographer notes that the metaphor of balancing is a “perfect 
metaphor to characterize his temperament,”148 and suggests that it 
reflects Chafee’s conviction that virtually all legal problems could be 
solved by balancing interests.149 He describes Chafee as 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 318; see also GRABER, supra note 3, at 137 (“Chafee’s 
attitude toward law was as partisan as his attitude toward politics.”). 
 147. GRABER, supra note 3, at 124; see also RABBAN, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that 
Chafee “essentially ignored prewar discussion of free speech that differed from his own focus 
on the protection of political dissent in a democracy”). 
 148. DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 87 
(1986). 
 149. Id. at 5. 
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“fundamentally conservative” and even attributes his concern with 
free speech to such conservatism.150 As Chafee himself once said in 
discussing the Abrams case, “[m]y sympathies and all my associations 
are with the men who save, who manage, and produce. But I want 
my side to fight fair.”151 In other words, Chafee was not an 
ideologue. 
The second defect was exposed in Part III: the “traditional” 
defense of free speech did not even rely on individual rights in the 
way the revisionist account supposes, suggesting that Chafee’s 
formulation may have been motivated by something other than a 
hostility to judicial protection of individual property rights. In this 
Part and the next, I thus offer an alternative, intellectual explanation 
for Chafee’s theory, which looks to the doctrinal and jurisprudential 
context in which Chafee wrote. I will first show how freedom of 
speech and property rights, though complementary in political 
theory, conflicted with each other in legal practice in the decades 
before World War I. In those years, corporations frequently asked 
courts to enjoin labor boycotts, forcing the courts to adjudicate 
between the property rights of the corporations and the free speech 
rights of the boycotting employees. And yet the courts seemed 
unable to find any principled way of deciding when one assertion of 
right trumped the other. I therefore suggest that in grounding free 
speech protection on new jurisprudential premises—that of the 
“social interest” in its protection—Chafee sought above all to 
overcome this doctrinal impasse. Part V will then explain how Chafee 
attempted to do just that by looking to the common law of 
defamation. 
A. The Traditional View: “Equity Will Not Enjoin Libels” 
The use of injunctions to resolve labor disputes around the turn 
of the century was highly controversial at the time and has been well 
documented by scholars. Writing in 1930, Professors Frankfurter 
and Greene wrote that “[a]s to labor controversies during the last 
quarter century, equity in America has absorbed the law.”152 Since 
then, First Amendment scholars have noted that the labor injunction 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Jerald S. Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian: Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Freedom 
of Speech, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 511, 525 (1969). 
 152. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 47 (1930). 
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cases constituted one of the principal areas of legal conflict over free 
speech in the years before World War I.153 At the same time, scholars 
of labor law have drawn the connection between the use of 
injunctions and the expanding conception of property—a point 
illustrated below.154 Less attention has been paid to the way in which 
the growth of equity jurisdiction over these types of disputes 
contributed directly to modern justifications for free speech. Such 
neglect is striking because Chafee, one of the chief expositors of 
modern free speech theory, was himself a professor of equity and 
came to the subject of free speech while studying equitable remedies 
for defamation.155 Indeed, it was the problem of enjoining libels that 
fueled his desire “to find out what this ‘liberty of the press’ really 
was.”156 But to see why the growth of equity jurisdiction—and the 
corollary expansion of property rights—prompted Chafee to 
investigate more deeply the legal meaning of freedom of speech first 
requires tracing the doctrinal history of equity jurisprudence and its 
relation to freedom of speech at common law. 
The willingness of courts of equity to issue injunctions to prevent 
the commission of torts grew continually throughout the nineteenth 
century. In principle, the elements required for asserting jurisdiction 
remained the same throughout; in order to receive injunctive relief, 
plaintiffs in tort actions had to show (1) irreparable damage to 
property and (2) that the remedy at law for damages was inadequate, 
usually because of the defendant’s continuing or repeated conduct.157 
 
 153. See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 3, at 169–73. 
 154. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 88 (1989) (explaining how the notion that an employer had “a property interest 
in his employment relations” allowed “virtually any strike to be cast as an interference with an 
employer’s property rights”); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 152, at 48 (“[T]he term 
‘property’ has been the lattice-work upon which the labor injunction has climbed.”); 
HORWITZ, supra note 139, at 154 (“During the 1880s, the federal courts had begun to use 
the idea of interference with these more abstract and intangible property rights to generate the 
labor injunction.”); see also Haggai Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of 
Entrepreneurial Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the Juridical Reorientation of 1886–1895, 
8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 307, 332 (1986) (explaining how equity decisions would “extend the 
concept of ‘property rights’ over employers’ exclusive powers to control and manage all 
business policies of their enterprises, including labor relations”). 
 155. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THIRTY-FIVE YEARS WITH FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2 (1952). 
 156. Id. 
 157. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED 
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 234 (12th ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1836); Roscoe 
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 
640, 640–41 (1916). 
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But whereas in the eighteenth century courts of equity had been 
extremely reluctant to enjoin even frequently-recurring trespasses—
perhaps the most straightforward harm to property—they became 
increasingly inclined to do so during the first half of the nineteenth 
century.158 Similarly, courts initially granted very few injunctions in 
cases of private nuisance, because enjoining a nuisance was viewed as 
an extreme measure only to be granted, in Chancellor Kent’s words, 
“with the utmost caution.”159 By mid-century, however, courts were 
issuing injunctions to restrain private nuisances with increasing 
frequency.160 
Still, even as the jurisdiction over such torts as trespass and 
nuisance expanded during the nineteenth century, courts of equity 
typically refused to enjoin libels. There were two formal justifications 
for this prohibition. The first was that equity jurisdiction did not 
extend to the commission of crimes.161 Although today libels are 
treated as private law tort actions, in England, at that time, even 
private, non-seditious libels could be prosecuted by the government 
for their tendency to breach the peace.162 The crucial distinction 
between civil suits and criminal prosecutions lay in the nature of the 
rights implicated. Whereas criminal prosecutions enforced the 
positive law of the community, civil law was seen to have a pre-
political, natural existence.163 As one prominent lawyer at the time 
wrote, a judge in a criminal case “is governed himself by positive law, 
and executes and inforces [sic] the will of the supreme power, which 
is the will of THE PEOPLE, in their aggregate capacity.”164 In contrast, 
“[c]ivil actions are founded in the private rights and wrongs of 
individuals; in which the legislative power of the civil state has 
 
 158. STORY, supra note 157, at 234 (“Formerly indeed Courts of Equity were extremely 
reluctant to interfere at all, even in regard to trespasses. But now there is not the slightest 
hesitation if the acts done or threatened to be done to the property would be ruinous or 
irreparable, or would impair the just enjoyment of the property in future.”). 
 159. Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions—
Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 625 n.24 (1976) (citing Att’y Gen. v. 
Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. 371 (N.Y. Ch. 1817)). 
 160. Id. at 628–29. 
 161. See, e.g., Montgomery & W. P. R. Co. v. Walton, 14 Ala. 207, 209 (1848) (“Nor 
can a case be found, where the chancellor has interposed by injunction, to restrain the 
commission of a crime, threatened by one to be perpetrated on another.”). 
 162. LEVY, supra note 19, at 9–10. 
 163. HORWITZ, supra note 139, at 11. 
 164. J.M. GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 33 (Arno Press 1972) (1819). 
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nothing to do . . . . Natural justice and right reason, are the 
foundation of all our private rights.”165 Whereas judges were well-
equipped by intellect and training to discern the rights involved in 
civil disputes, criminal prosecutions required juries because only they 
could legitimately enforce the positive law of the community; since 
courts of equity lacked juries, they had no jurisdiction over crimes. 
The 1818 English case of Gee v. Pritchard166 came to stand for 
this distinction between property rights and crimes. In that case, the 
plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant, her adopted son, from 
publishing in a newspaper letters she had written to him in 
confidence.167 Lord Eldon did issue the injunction, but he carefully 
articulated the narrow basis of his decision. After initially declaring 
that “[t]he publication of a libel is a crime; and I have no jurisdiction 
to prevent the commission of crimes,”168 he explained why 
jurisdiction was nonetheless proper: 
I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written in 
confidence, or because the publication of them may wound the 
feelings of the plaintiff; but if mischievous effects of that kind can 
be apprehended in cases in which this court has been accustomed, 
on the ground of property, to forbid publication, it would not 
become me to abandon the jurisdiction which my predecessors 
have exercised . . . .169 
So long as property rights were at issue, the court seemed to be 
saying it had jurisdiction, regardless of whether or not the 
publication happened also to constitute the commission of a crime. 
The second basis for refusing to enjoin libels was that doing so 
violated the common law protection of freedom of speech, which 
barred any prior restraint of a publication. Brandreth v. Lance170 was 
the case Zechariah Chafee later recalled as stimulating his interest in 
free speech, and the reason is not hard to see.171 This 1839 decision 
of the New York Chancery Court affirmed the rule that a court of 
 
 165. Id. at 36. 
 166. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston 402 (1818), in CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF 
AGAINST DEFAMATION: SUPPLEMENTARY TO CHAFEE’S CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF 
AGAINST TORTS 8 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1930). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 170. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839). 
 171. CHAFEE, supra note 155, at 2. 
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equity could not enjoin libels because taking jurisdiction would 
violate the defendant’s freedom of speech.172 The plaintiff, a well-
known pill vendor, sought to enjoin a disgruntled former employee 
from publishing a false, libelous pamphlet entitled “The Life, 
Exploits, Comical Adventures and Amorous Intrigues of Benjamin 
Brandling, M. D. V. P. L. V. S., a distinguished pill vender, written 
by himself.”173 In denying the request, the court declared at the 
outset that “[i]t is very evident that this court cannot assume 
jurisdiction of the case presented by complainant’s bill, or of any 
other case of the like nature, without infringing upon the liberty of 
the press.”174 
More important, although some American authorities, such as 
Joseph Story, had accepted Gee as good law,175 the court expressed 
deep reservations about that decision. It questioned whether Gee 
really implicated a property right at all since a more plausible motive 
for the plaintiff’s suit in Gee was her desire to protect from public 
exposure the intimate thoughts expressed in her letters rather than to 
vindicate any supposed property right in their literary value.176 “[I]t 
may, perhaps, be doubted,” the Chancellor concluded, “whether his 
lordship in that case did not, to some extent, endanger the freedom 
of the press by assuming jurisdiction of the case as a matter of 
property.”177 Indeed, the facts in Brandreth seemed far more capable 
than those in Gee of supporting a decision on the basis of harm to 
property since Brandreth’s pill business was branded with his own 
name and might well have been damaged by the negative publicity 
the pamphlet caused. Even so, the court refused to enjoin the 
publication.178 
Both Gee and Brandreth eventually came to stand for the 
proposition that a court of equity would not enjoin a libel unless 
property rights were violated.179 At the same time, the holding in 
Brandreth reflected a greater reluctance on the part of American 
courts to interpret “property” as broadly as Lord Eldon had in Gee. 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 24. 
 174. Id. 
 175. STORY, supra note 157, at 250. 
 176. Brandreth, 8 Paige Ch. at 26. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 387 (1855). 
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This divergence between the English and American practice 
continued through the 1870s and was reflected in a line of cases in 
which American courts consistently refused to enjoin libelous speech 
potentially injurious to a plaintiff’s business. Many of these cases 
were slander of title cases in which the defendant had falsely 
informed, or threatened to inform, the plaintiff’s customers that the 
plaintiff had infringed the defendant’s trademark or patent. 
In the 1873 case of Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manufacturing 
Co., for instance, the defendant had told plaintiff’s customers that 
the plaintiff’s toilet mirrors infringed defendant’s patent.180 In 
denying the request for an injunction, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court cited Gee v. Pritchard for the proposition that “[t]he 
jurisdiction of a Court of Chancery does not extend to cases of libel 
or slander, or of false representations as to the character or quality of 
the plaintiff’s property, or as to his title thereto, which involve no 
breach of contract.”181 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
dismissed two recent English cases, both of which had upheld 
jurisdiction in analogous circumstances, as “so inconsistent with 
these authorities and with well settled principles” that they ought 
not be followed.182 
Similarly, in Kidd v. Horry a federal court held on similar facts to 
those of Boston Diatite that the plaintiff’s request to enjoin 
defendant from publishing circulars challenging plaintiff’s patent 
must be rejected because the court possessed no such power.183 
Although the defendant cited English cases to support an injunction, 
the court distinguished those as decisions based on acts of 
Parliament.184 Then, citing Brandreth and Boston Diatite, it held that 
“neither the statute law of this country, nor any well-considered 
judgment of the courts, has introduced this new branch of equity, 
into our jurisprudence.”185 
 
 180. Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 69 (1873). 
 181. Id. at 70. 
 182. Id. The cases referred to are Dixon v. Holden, 7 L.R.Eq. 488 (1869) and Springhead 
Spinning Co. v. Riley, 6 L.R.Eq. 551 (1868). 
 183. Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 775 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 775–76. 
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Other courts during this time followed a similar rule.186 In each 
of them, courts refused to enjoin libelous speech, holding it was 
both beyond the power of the courts of equity, and correlatively, a 
violation of freedom of speech. In 1886, John Norton Pomeroy 
summarized the state of the law on this issue in his Treatise on 
Equity: “The American courts seem, thus far, unwilling to follow the 
example of the recent English decisions, and they decline to extend 
the jurisdiction so as to restrain such torts as libels on business, 
slanders of title, and the like.”187 But Pomeroy’s qualification of 
“thus far” would prove prescient. For beginning in 1888, American 
courts of equity became increasingly willing to issue injunctions to 
restrain libelous publications in circumstances almost exactly 
analogous to those in the cases above. These latter cases would soon 
provide the crucial precedents for the labor injunctions courts began 
issuing around the same time. Both lines of cases rested on a 
dramatic expansion in the meaning of the term “property.” 
B. Property and Equity 
Commentators have documented well the change in the 
conception of property during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.188 In the late eighteenth century, Blackstone had described 
property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion 
 
 186. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic Sewing Mach. Co., 49 Ga. 70, 74 (1873) 
(refusing to enjoin the publication of a newspaper article falsely reporting that the defendant 
had won a product award at a state fair and concluding that the “settled rule” was that “[l]ibel 
and slander, however illegal and outrageous, will not be enjoined” and that it was a 
“perversion of language to say that the complainant had a property right in the truth of the 
report”); Life Ass’n of Am. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173, 179 (1876) (citing both Gee and 
Brandreth while refusing to enjoin the publication of allegedly libelous statements); see also 
Balt. Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 F. 95, 95 (D. Mass. 1886) (citing Kidd and Boston Diatite as 
authority for declining jurisdiction in a slander of title case); Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Mass. 
484, 484 (1876) (citing Boston Diatite as authority for denying jurisdiction in a slander of title 
case). 
 187. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 390–91 
(San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1883). 
 188. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 139, at 145–69; Thomas Grey, The Disintegration of 
Property, in PROPERTY 69, 73 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Kenneth 
J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980). 
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of the right of any other individual in the universe.”189 The 
traditional Blackstonian conception referred primarily to real estate 
or physical objects.190 But as such new sources of value as corporate 
stock, goodwill, and patents were bought and sold, this “physicalist” 
conception of property began to erode. As Professor Horwitz writes, 
“During the course of the nineteenth century, there was a consistent 
tendency toward generalization and abstraction of the idea of 
property in order to accommodate these new and intangible 
interests.”191 Thus, in 1872, one Supreme Court Justice asserted that 
“[p]roperty is everything which has an exchangeable value, and the 
right of property includes the power to dispose of it according to the 
will of the owner.”192 Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court held 
that a business enterprise was itself a property right deserving of 
protection under the Constitution.193 Such expansion made it much 
easier for courts of equity to justify taking jurisdiction over libelous 
speech. 
The first decision to reflect this change was an 1888 decision by 
an Illinois federal district court. Like Boston Diatite and Kidd, the 
case of Emack v. Kane194 involved a slander of title claim. The 
plaintiff, a manufacturer of “muffled” slates used by schoolchildren, 
sought to enjoin the defendant from sending circulars to plaintiff’s 
customers claiming that he had infringed the defendant’s patent on 
such slates.195 Here, though, the court granted the injunction.196 In 
justifying its decision, the court distinguished Kidd as involving 
merely a challenge to the validity of the patent, whereas in this case 
the defendant had made threats of litigation.197 While recognizing 
that cases of “mere personal slander or libel may perhaps properly be 
left to the courts of law,” the court held that “[i]t shocks [the 
court’s] sense of justice to say that a court of equity cannot restrain 
 
 189. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1766). 
 190. Vandevelde, supra note 188, at 329. 
 191. HORWITZ, supra note 139, at 145. 
 192. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 127 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 193. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921). 
 194. Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46 (N.D. Ill. 1888). 
 195. Id. at 47. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 50. 
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systematic and methodical outrages like this, by one man upon 
another’s property rights.”198 
Five years later, the Supreme Court of Indiana reached a similar 
result in Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark-Arrester Co.199 Here again, 
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing circulars 
that challenged the validity of his patent and threatened litigation. In 
upholding jurisdiction, the court distinguished the Boston Diatite 
line of authority as not involving threats of litigation.200 This case, it 
asserted, “involves more than libel of title. It charges the false and 
malicious destruction of the appellee’s property rights, in injuring its 
business . . . .”201 Then, after quoting the Emack court’s opinion 
almost in full, it acknowledged the objection raised by the Boogher 
court, namely that enjoining such circulars interfered with the 
freedom of speech.202 Virtually without any argument, however, the 
court refused to accept that decision as authority and dismissed its 
argument as not “sound.”203 In A.B. Farquhar Co. v. National 
Harrow Co., the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion.204 On 
facts similar to those of Shoemaker, the court held that while good 
faith challenges to the validity of a patent were legal, “where, as is 
here averred, they are not made or issued with such intent, but in 
bad faith, and solely for the purpose of destroying the business of 
another . . . property rights are fraudulently assailed.”205 In other 
words, the court held that because the defendant had an improper 
motive, the plaintiff’s property rights were therefore injured. 
These decisions did not necessarily represent willful judicial 
overreaching. Although the opinions do not recount the facts in 
detail, the cases appear to have been distinguishable from the earlier 
line insofar as the defendants were threatening customers with 
lawsuits rather than merely notifying them of a challenge to the 
plaintiff’s intellectual property. Still, as we will see, the tension 
between the two lines of cases was noted by courts at the time. 
Furthermore, the opinions demonstrate well the consequences of 
 
 198. Id. at 50–51. 
 199. Shoemaker v. S. Bend Spark-Arrester Co., 35 N.E. 280 (Ind. 1893). 
 200. Id. at 282–84. 
 201. Id. at 282. 
 202. Id. at 282–83. 
 203. Id. at 283. 
 204. A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 102 F. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1900). 
 205. Id. 
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characterizing plaintiffs’ injury as a violation of property rights. Once 
a court concluded such a right was implicated, it felt justified in 
freely granting an injunction. Furthermore, the courts seemed to be 
suggesting that the intent of the defendant determined whether or 
not the plaintiff’s property rights were injured and, therefore, 
whether or not the traditionally extreme measure of equitable relief 
was justified. It was precisely this logic that enabled courts to justify 
granting injunctions against labor boycotts. 
C. Equity and Free Speech 
As is well known, beginning in the late 1880s, courts became 
increasingly willing to issue injunctions to quell labor strife. The 
violence that erupted at Chicago’s Haymarket Square in May of 
1886 and the increasing use of national strikes by workers 
encouraged courts to take a more aggressive role in seeking to 
maintain labor peace.206 As a result, the so-called “labor injunction” 
soon became notorious among workers as a means of suppressing 
what they perceived to be their legitimate right to demand better 
conditions.207 No doubt a complex combination of political, social, 
and economic factors explain why injunctions were issued with such 
frequency, but offering such an explanation of this change is not our 
concern. Instead, for our purpose, these decisions matter insofar as 
they expose how doctrinally superficial courts’ efforts were in 
reconciling conflicts between property rights and free speech. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Sherry v. 
Perkins was one of the first to enjoin picketers on the grounds that 
such speech constituted a violation of property rights rather than a 
libel.208 In a short two-page opinion, the court distinguished Boston 
Diatite as a “case of defamation only” and held that the banner the 
defendants were carrying outside of the plaintiff’s business was 
“injurious to the plaintiff’s business and property, and was a 
nuisance, such as a court of equity will grant relief against.”209 
In Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, a federal court 
extended the reach of the new rule and offered a somewhat more 
 
 206. See FORBATH, supra note 154, at 63. 
 207. See id. at 73. 
 208. Sherry v. Perkins, 17 N.E. 307, 310 (Mass. 1888). 
 209. Id. at 310. 
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elaborate justification.210 In this case the plaintiff sought a 
preliminary injunction to stop the defendant union from boycotting 
the plaintiff’s business for its failure to hire union workers. In 
granting the injunction, the court cited Boston Diatite and Kidd for 
the proposition that a court of equity would not restrain a libel, but 
it then framed the issue as whether or not “this case falls within the 
rule.”211 The court concluded that it did not, because although the 
union had made no explicit threats, “the language of the circulars has 
no doubtful meaning,” and the word “boycott” was itself a threat.212 
The defendant did not merely intend to libel the plaintiff but instead 
possessed a “malicious intent to injure complainant’s business.”213 
This decision was followed by another federal court the next year. In 
Coeur D’Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v. Miners’ Union, the 
court distinguished enjoinable injuries to property from non-
enjoinable libels by reference to the presence of “words which will 
operate to intimidate and prevent the customers of a party from 
dealing with” that party, even if no threat is explicit.214 Citing both 
Casey and Emack, the court granted the injunction.215 
Before long, the trend of issuing injunctions in such cases 
seemed so evidently justified that courts began to treat the bar on 
the prior restraint of speech as an anomaly in the law. The Missouri 
Supreme Court, for instance, acknowledged that courts had 
traditionally denied themselves the power to enjoin libels but insisted 
that 
the law of libel is peculiar, and those cases turn upon that 
peculiarity. The freedom of the press has been so jealously guarded 
both in England and in this country that our law of libel is like no 
other law on the books. . . . Libel is the only act injurious to the 
rights of another which a man cannot, under proper conditions, be 
restrained from committing; and that is so because the constitution 
says he shall be allowed to do it, and answer for it afterwards.216 
 
 210. Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 F. 135 (S.D. Ohio 1891). 
 211. Id. at 143. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 144. 
 214. Coeur D’Alene Consol. & Mining Co. v. Miners’ Union, 51 F. 260, 267 (D. Idaho 
1892). 
 215. Id. at 266–67. 
 216. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 32 S.W. 1106, 1108 (Mo. 1895) (quoting the 
trial court below). 
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The court then issued the injunction, finding the legal remedy to be 
inadequate.217 The defendant clearly had intended to “destroy the 
business of these plaintiffs,” the court held, and to “force the eight 
or nine hundred men, women, boys, and girls who are earning their 
livings in the plaintiff’s employ to quit their work against their 
will.”218 
A more penetrating analysis of the doctrinal difficulty courts 
faced was offered in two separate dissenting opinions in Vegelahn v. 
Guntner.219 In this case, the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld an injunction preventing two men from 
patrolling the streets outside plaintiff’s business to demand better 
wages. The court cited Sherry and Coeur D’Alene Consolidated and 
employed the oft-repeated distinction that “a court of equity will 
decline to issue an injunction to restrain the commission of a crime; 
but a continuing injury to property or business may be enjoined.”220 
In dissent, though, Justice Field attacked the premise of the 
court’s holding. After pointing out that “[t]he practice of issuing 
injunctions in cases of this kind is of very recent origin,” he 
distinguished the English cases upholding jurisdiction as based on 
Parliament’s Judicature Act and said the American cases following 
them were thus wrongly decided.221 He then denied that the 
defendant’s “malicious” intent ought to bear on the issue of whether 
or not the plaintiff’s property rights were violated: 
For myself, I have been unable to see how malice is necessarily 
decisive. To persuade one man not to enter into the employment 
of another, by telling the truth to him about such other person and 
his business, I am not convinced is actionable at common law, 
whatever the motive may be.222 
Of course, if such speech was false, the defendant could be liable for 
libel at law, but given the traditional rule against preventive relief for 
libel, Justice Field contended that “something more is necessary to 
justify issuing an injunction.”223 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). 
 220. Id. at 1078. 
 221. Id. at 1078 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. at 1079. 
 223. Id. 
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In a separate, now-famous dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes made a similar point, but he directed his attack on a deeper 
jurisprudential level. Like Justice Field, Justice Holmes denied that a 
plaintiff’s right to be free from injury necessarily hinged on the intent 
of the defendant.224 Instead, liability ultimately depended on whether 
or not the law sanctioned the type of injuries he inflicted on the 
plaintiff. “[I]n numberless instances,” Justice Holmes maintained, 
“the law warrants the intentional infliction of temporal damage, 
because it regards it as justified.”225 The critical question was, what 
counts as a justification? To this, Justice Holmes answered that 
“[t]he true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of 
social advantage.”226 Just as we recognize competition among 
businesses as socially advantageous, he reasoned, so ought we 
recognize the competition between labor and capital as a legitimate 
part of the “free struggle for life.”227 Similarly, whether a defendant’s 
speech amounted to a permissible warning or an illegal “threat” 
ultimately depended on the legality of that which was threatened. 
“As a general rule,” he maintained, “what you may do in a certain 
event you may threaten to do—that is, give warning of your 
intention to do—in that event.”228 Thus, if the boycotters were not 
threatening violence but merely threatening not to work, their 
speech ought not be restrained. 
But Justice Holmes’s protest fell mostly on deaf ears. Courts 
continued to uphold the use of injunctions against boycotts and 
other types of speech harmful to businesses.229 One court accurately 
 
 224. Id. at 1082 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 1080. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1081. Holmes had already developed this argument in a law review article two 
years before. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV 1 
(1894). 
 228. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 229. See A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chi. Typographical Union, 83 N.E. 940 (Ill. 1908) 
(upholding the grant of an injunction against union picketers); Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Myers, 
140 Ill. App. 392 (1908) (upholding the grant of a preliminary injunction against plaintiff’s 
ex-employee to stop him from publishing libelous articles about plaintiff); M. Steinart & Sons 
Co. v. Tagen, 93 N.E. 584 (Mass. 1911) (upholding the grant of an injunction preventing 
union members from driving around the streets with placards and slogans adverse to the 
plaintiff); Davis v. New England Ry. Publ’g Co., 89 N.E. 565 (Mass. 1909) (granting an 
injunction that prevented defendant from publishing a business directory it claimed included 
all businesses while excluding plaintiff’s business for the sole purpose of causing injury to 
plaintiff’s business); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1902) (reversing a 
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noted in 1898 that “while some writers have doubted the remedy by 
injunction [to restrain labor boycotts], it is now settled beyond 
dispute.”230 Finally, in 1911 the United States Supreme Court gave 
its official sanction to the doctrine.231 
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., the Supreme Court 
upheld an injunction against Samuel Gompers, the president of the 
American Federation of Labor and editor of the American 
Federationist, preventing him from organizing a boycott of the 
plaintiff’s business and from publishing its name on a list of 
employers labeled with the words “Unfair” and “We Don’t 
Patronize.”232 Writing for the majority, Justice Lamar addressed 
Gomper’s free speech defense but dismissed it as irrelevant to the 
issue. “We will not enter upon a discussion of the constitutional 
question raised,” he explained, because the defendant’s challenge 
“raises no question as to an abridgment of free speech, but involves 
the power of a court of equity to enjoin the defendants from 
continuing a boycott which, by words and signals, printed or spoken, 
caused or threatened irreparable damage.”233 While acknowledging 
the legal definition of “boycott” to be a question of some dispute 
among the courts, he noted that “the strong current of authority” 
had held the publication of letters or circulars to “constitute a means 
whereby a boycott is unlawfully continued” and could therefore be 
lawfully enjoined.234 Furthermore, the courts’ protective powers, he 
 
lower court’s refusal to enjoin defendant publisher from publishing false and harmful articles 
about plaintiff’s products). 
 230. Beck v. Ry. Teamsters’ Protective Union, 77 N.W. 13, 21 (Mich. 1898). 
 231. The Court had already upheld an injunction of a boycott against the Pullman Palace 
Car Company in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), overruled by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
194 (1968), but the petitioners in that case did not assert a freedom of speech defense. 
 232. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436 (1911). 
 233. Id. at 436–37. 
 234. Id. at 437. Later treatises confirmed this view. See W.A. MARTIN, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS § 106 (1910) (recognizing a split in authority on the issue but 
noting the “weight of authority” supports granting injunctions against boycott circulars); 5 
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 2048 (2d ed. 1919) 
(explaining that although “the contention is sometimes made that the constitutional guaranties 
of freedom of speech and the well-recognized rule against enjoining a libel are a bar to the 
equitable remedy” in disputes over boycott notices, “the great weight of authority” is in accord 
with the view that such notices may be enjoined); THOMAS C. SPELLING & JAMES HAMILTON 
LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INJUNCTIONS § 125 (1926) (“As is well 
known, courts of equity ordinarily abstain from issuing injunctions against libels. But the 
practice of restraining the use of circulars and similar instrumentalities in the carrying on of a 
boycott or other trade conflict is well established.”). 
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maintained, “extend to every device whereby property is irreparably 
damaged or commerce is illegally restrained.”235 
Thus, following the practice of other courts, the Supreme Court 
refused to address the scope or meaning of freedom of speech. 
Instead, it merely dismissed the First Amendment protections as 
inapplicable when property rights were at issue, rendering any 
further analysis unnecessary. The superficiality of the doctrinal 
analysis courts employed in this area was typified perhaps best of all 
by the lower court’s decision in Gompers. In upholding the 
injunction, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
declared that “there is a point where the right of free speech and a 
free press ends, and unlawful interference with personal and property 
rights begins. When the citizen passes this point, he can no longer 
claim the protection of the Constitution.”236 Where that point was, 
however, neither court would say. 
Professor Rabban describes well the courts’ treatment of First 
Amendment arguments during this period when he notes the 
“analytic sterility of most opinions.”237 As he points out, even when 
courts vindicated free speech claims, they rarely discussed the precise 
scope of the First Amendment’s protection.238 For Professor Rabban, 
such decisions nevertheless prove that “the tradition of insensitivity 
was not so dominant that only an intellectual breakthrough in 
constitutional interpretation could have created the possibility of 
different results.”239 But the doctrinal survey above suggests that 
 
 235. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 438. 
 236. AFL v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 83, 112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1909) 
(Van Orsdel, J., concurring). 
 237. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 176. 
 238. Id.; see, e.g., Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 67 S.W. 391, 395 (Mo. 
1902) (noting that the Missouri Constitution’s protection of freedom of speech “makes no 
distinction, and authorizes no difference to be made by courts or legislatures, between a 
proceeding set on foot to enjoin the publication of a libel, and one to enjoin the publication of 
any other sort or nature, however injurious it may be, or to prohibit the use of free speech or free 
writing on any subject whatever; because, wherever the authority of injunction begins, there 
the right of free speech, free writing, or free publication ends” (emphasis added)); see also 
Kelley v. Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg. Co., 44 F. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1890) (refusing to enjoin 
defendant from publishing circulars stating his rights as a patentee); Flint v. Hutchinson 
Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804 (Mo. 1892) (refusing to enjoin defendant from slandering 
plaintiff’s title to a patent because doing so deprived defendant of trial by jury and freedom of 
speech); Lindsay & Co. v. Mont. Fed’n of Labor, 96 P. 127 (Mont. 1908) (refusing to enjoin 
defendant union from publishing circulars encouraging customers to boycott plaintiff’s 
business). 
 239. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 176. 
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such an intellectual breakthrough was precisely what was required to 
adequately deal with freedom of speech. For the courts’ frequent 
invocation of property rights as a basis for defeating free speech 
defenses exposed the term “property” to be properly the conclusion 
of a legal argument rather than one of its premises. 
D. Free Speech and Property 
This, at least, was Chafee’s view. Recall his exhortation that 
arguments over competing claims to “rights” were fruitless because 
“each side takes the position of the man who was arrested for 
swinging his arms,” who is told by the judge that “[y]our right to 
swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.”240 
Chafee likely had in mind statements like those of the D.C. Circuit 
in Buck’s Stove & Range Co.241 But he was not alone in his 
dissatisfaction with “talk of rights.” By the time Chafee wrote his 
1919 article, legal scholars had already been challenging the 
jurisprudential assumptions of the current legal orthodoxy for years. 
For them, the courts’ tendency to consistently find the infringement 
of property rights revealed how insufficiently analyzed was their 
concept of a legal right. 
The most well known attempt to provide a more rigorous 
framework for the analysis of rights was offered by Professor Wesley 
Hohfeld. In an influential article, Hohfeld said that concepts often 
loosely referred to as “rights” and “duties” were in fact composed of 
sixteen distinct “jural relations.”242 According to Hohfeld, a “right” 
could refer either to a true right (the law gives A a claim to X and 
imposes a duty on others not to interfere with X) or it could refer to 
a privilege (the law permits A to do X, but does not impose a duty 
on others to refrain from interfering with X).243 Hohfeld’s analysis 
 
 240. Chafee, supra note 6, at 957. 
 241. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D.C. at 112–13 (“[T]here is a point where the 
right of free speech and a free press ends, and unlawful interference with personal and property 
rights begins. When the citizen passes this point, he can no longer claim the protection of the 
Constitution.”). 
 242. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–30 (1913). 
 243. The word was also used to refer to a power (the law gives A the ability to change his 
or others’ legal relation with respect to X, e.g., by buying or selling X), or it could refer to an 
immunity (the law protects A from having his legal relations with respect to X altered by 
others). Id. at 24, 55. Each of these conceptions, Hohfeld explained, has a “jural opposite” 
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clarified many legal debates at the time, and in particular it seemed 
to offer a better interpretation of the nature of the conflicts 
implicated in the boycott cases.244 If a plaintiff corporation merely 
had a privilege to compete in the marketplace and to contract for 
labor rather than a right to do so, it would not be inconsistent to 
hold that the boycotting unions also had a privilege to speak freely 
about the corporation to potential employees. 
Hohfeld’s scheme thus offered a formal way to understand 
Justice Holmes’s point in Vegelahn v. Gunter that the real issue was 
whether or not the law would condone the “temporal damage” 
inflicted on plaintiff by defendant.245 If it did condone such damage, 
the law would only grant the company a privilege to hire whomever 
would consent to employment, but if it did not, it would grant the 
company a true right to do so. But while some scholars, like 
Hohfeld, attacked the concept of a right in orthodox legal thought 
through formal analysis of legal relations, others sought to get at the 
substance behind the form. These scholars sought to analyze more 
carefully what purposes the assignment of a right served. They 
sought to understand, for instance, why the law permitted the 
defendant to inflict “temporal damage” on the plaintiff in some 
circumstances, but not in others. One such scholar, Roscoe Pound, 
later recounted why attempts to define rights precisely so often 
failed: “[T]he compromises and adjustments which were called for 
could not be derived from the simple idea of freedom. The law 
books of the last century are full of curious situations of logical 
impasse to which such attempts continually led.”246 
In this Part, I have tried to explain why Chafee perceived a need 
to get beyond “talk of rights.” By the time Chafee began to 
investigate the First Amendment, the legal enforcement of private 
property rights not only failed to entail the protection of free speech 
rights but in many cases precluded it. In the next Part, I argue that 
the “logical impasse” noted by Pound prompted Chafee to clarify 
the analysis of free speech rights. I thus seek to show how Chafee 
could have invoked the language of “social interests” without 
believing himself to be dramatically altering the law of free speech. 
 
and a “jural correlative.” Id. at 30. For instance, the opposite of a power is a disability, but its 
correlative is a liability. Id. 
 244. HORWITZ, supra note 139, at 155. 
 245. Id.; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896). 
 246. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 159 (1923). 
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V. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND FREE SPEECH 
According to the revisionist account, Zechariah Chafee’s effort 
to defend free speech on the basis of the “social interest” in its 
protection was a bold theoretical innovation. Chafee ignored its 
traditional libertarian defense, this view maintains, and replaced it 
with a theory better suited to his Progressive political views.247 But 
the fact that, as we have seen, the libertarians were less zealous in 
their advocacy of free speech than has been thought renders this view 
less plausible. Although the protection of a “sphere of mental 
conduct” would seem to follow from the enforcement of property 
rights, in practice, competing claims of private property and free 
speech frequently came into direct conflict. The labor injunction 
cases revealed this to be true even under the restrictive Blackstonian 
view that the First Amendment only bars the prior restraint of 
speech. In this Part, I argue that by grounding his theory in the 
principles of sociological jurisprudence, Chafee sought above all to 
resolve this doctrinal conflict. I further contend that Chafee was 
justified in characterizing his argument as traditional rather than 
novel. These two claims may appear to contradict each other since 
“sociological jurisprudence” was a distinctly modern phenomenon, 
but I hope to show why they do not so conflict. 
Doing so requires a two-step argument. The first step is to show 
that sociological jurisprudence was more than a political ideology; it 
was instead a philosophy of law. To be sure, its advocates were 
concerned with the social effects of judicial decisions, and they saw 
law as a tool for social improvement. The revisionist account 
emphasizes these aspects of sociological jurisprudence, suggesting 
that the movement was little more than the legal-academic arm of 
political Progressivism. I contend rather that it constituted a 
coherent—if perhaps not complete—philosophy of law. Specifically, 
its central tenets consisted in the view that (1) legal rights were 
essentially instrumental in nature; (2) such rights were often justified 
by their ability to secure specifically social interests; and (3) in 
defining the scope and limit of a legal right, competing interests—
whether individual or social—had to be balanced against each other. 
In other words, sociological jurisprudence consisted of a set of ideas 
 
 247. GRABER, supra note 3, at 124; RABBAN, supra note 3, at 4–5; Heyman, supra note 
5, at 1303–04. 
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whose appeal lay in its intellectual coherence, not just the political 
consequences of its application to economic legislation. 
The second step is to show that these jurisprudential tenets 
particularly illuminated the traditional justification for freedom of 
speech. In his study of defamation law, Chafee discovered that free 
speech defenses in libel suits (1) were traditionally defined 
instrumentally, (2) almost always served public purposes, and (3) 
frequently required courts to balance individual and social interests. 
In the context of defamation law, free speech was protected not as a 
property right itself but instead as a publicly-justified exception to, or 
carve out of, the prevailing scheme of individual rights, specifically 
that of reputation. In Chafee’s formulation of freedom of speech, 
therefore, we see doctrinal continuity through jurisprudential 
change. 
A. Sociological Jurisprudence and Social Interests 
At the heart of sociological jurisprudence lies the concept of an 
“interest.” Professor Graber characterizes the notion that 
“government should advance social interests” as one of the 
“legitimate first premises” of “sociological jurisprudence.”248 
According to Graber, in developing his theory, Chafee was thus 
“forced to change the premises, rather than the conclusions, of free-
speech argument.”249 But the idea that the function of law was to 
secure human “interests” was not a “first premise” of sociological 
jurisprudence; instead, it was one of its most significant conclusions. 
The arguments supporting it were most famously elaborated by 
Chafee’s teacher, Roscoe Pound, but when Chafee referred to the 
rights/interests distinction in “Freedom of Speech in Wartime,” he 
properly credited the German legal philosopher Rudolph Von 
Ihering with originating the idea and the American jurist John 
Chipman Gray with developing it.250 Together, these theorists laid 
the intellectual groundwork for Chafee’s defense of free speech. 
In Law as a Means to an End, Rudolph Ihering sought to 
establish the philosophical foundation for an instrumental 
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conception of law.251 He began with first principles: according to the 
“principle of sufficient reason,” everything that exists must be the 
consequence of some antecedent change or phenomenon.252 In the 
material world, we call this cause; thus natural processes are caused 
by the laws of physics. As applied to the will, however, we call this 
principle purpose.253 So, just as no physical effect can exist without 
some cause, no action of the will (human or animal) can exist 
without a purpose. Ihering used an intriguing comparison to 
illustrate this point: “The dry sponge fills itself with water; the thirsty 
animal drinks. Is it the same process? Externally, yes; internally, no. 
For the sponge does not fill itself in order to do so, but the animal 
does drink in order to quench its thirst.”254 Ihering thus defined the 
will as the “the maintenance of one’s own causality over against the 
external world.”255 But he felt compelled to qualify this metaphysical 
dichotomy lest it appear naïve in the face of Darwinism. Neither 
denying nor affirming the validity of Darwin’s theory, Ihering 
conceded that his speculations rested on an article of faith: “Only 
one of two things is possible. Either cause is the moving force of the 
world, or purpose [is]. In my opinion it is purpose.”256 
If actions of the will only had a purpose or, in Aristotelian terms, 
a “final cause,” human action was properly understood as essentially 
instrumental to those purposes. No action could be taken for the 
sake of the action itself, but must instead be conducted for some 
other goal—even if that goal is reached at the same time the action is 
taken.257 “Whoever drinks wants indeed to drink,” Ihering explained, 
“but he wants it only for the sake of the consequence which it has 
for him.”258 A purposeful action was therefore synonymous with 
action itself. “An act without a purpose,” he contended, “is just as 
 
 251. RUDOLPH VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Boston Book Co. 1913) 
(1877). Ihering is no longer a household name among lawyers, but he profoundly influenced a 
generation of legal scholars. One commentator has described Ihering as “the great impetus” to 
sociological jurisprudence, and Roscoe Pound himself cited Ihering’s discussion of interests as 
a breakthrough in the analysis of rights. James A. Gardner, The Sociological Jurisprudence of 
Roscoe Pound, 7 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1962). 
 252. VON IHERING, supra note 251, at 1. 
 253. Id. at 2. 
 254. Id. at 3. 
 255. Id. at 17. 
 256. Id. at lvii. 
 257. Id. at 9. 
 258. Id. 
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much an impossibility as is an effect without a cause.”259 Ihering 
believed that most animals also had wills and so acted from a final 
rather than efficient cause, but in humans such a purpose went by a 
special name: interest.260 Just as animals drink to quench their thirst, 
so do humans act instrumentally in order to satisfy their interests.261 
This did not imply that man was inherently self-interested; Ihering 
distinguished between man’s “egoistic” and “ethical” interest.262 The 
latter was prompted by “the feeling on the part of the agent of the 
ethical destiny of his being.”263 Regardless, action without interest 
was no more intelligible than cause without effect.264 
Given that our various interests often pull us in different 
directions, how do we—and how ought we—decide among 
competing courses of action? Ihering said we formed in our minds 
ideas or “pictures” of future states in which our interests were 
satisfied, and then we compared those future states with each 
other.265 Whether we accepted one or the other, he suggested, 
“depends upon the preponderance of the reasons for the deed over 
the reasons against it. Without such a preponderance the will can no 
more be set in motion than the balance can move when there is an 
equal weight in both scales . . . .”266 In other words, any conscious 
human action requires us to balance our interests. 
The implications for a legal system of such a moral psychology is 
not hard to imagine. Like Jeremy Bentham, Ihering thought law 
should appeal directly to human interests, through reward and 
punishment, in order to guide human behavior.267 Indeed, the bulk 
of Law as a Means to an End consists of a survey of the various 
“social levers,” from commercial law to criminal law, which Ihering 
saw as crucial to ensuring effective social cooperation.268 More 
important, though, such social levers protected those same interests 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 22. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 45. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 36–40. 
 265. Id. at 7–8. 
 266. Id. at 8. 
 267. Id. at 33. The similarity between Ihering and Bentham was not lost on Ihering’s 
contemporaries. The editor to the 1913 edition compares the views of the two philosopher-
jurists in his preface. Id. at xvii–xxi. 
 268. Id. at 71–423. 
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on which it depended for its force. The right to property, for 
instance, grew out of the individual’s interest in maintaining his own 
existence—that is, his interest in life itself.269 Without property, for 
instance, “there is no secure future for existence . . . without law 
there is no securing life and property.”270 
Ihering’s view that human interests formed an essential 
component of law found a receptive audience in John Chipman 
Gray, the Harvard Professor and lawyer. Like Ihering, Gray asserted 
in The Nature and Sources of the Law that “[h]uman society is 
organized for the protection and advancement of human interests” 
and that “[t]he object of its organization is to insure the doing of 
certain things which individuals could not do.”271 In order to 
accomplish this goal, he explained, “the chief means employed by an 
organized society is to compel individuals to do or to forbear from 
doing particular things.”272 But Gray also criticized Ihering’s analysis 
of legal rights for being insufficiently precise. Whereas Ihering had 
suggested that legal rights were legally-protected interests, Gray 
sought to clarify that the right was merely an instrument of the state 
used to secure legal interests.
 
The conduct “organized society” 
compelled an individual to do, or forbear from doing, consisted in 
that individual’s legal duties, and the correlative of those duties were 
legal rights.273 In short, a legal right was just “the means by which 
enjoyment of the interest is secured.”274 
The work of Ihering and Gray greatly influenced the intellectual 
leader of sociological jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound, who developed a 
more elaborate classification and analysis of the interests protected by 
law.275 According to Pound, all interests could be categorized as 
individual interests, public interests, or social interests.276 Individual 
interests traditionally had been labeled “natural rights,” and they 
 
 269. Id. at 49. 
 270. Id. 
 271. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 12 (Macmillan 
1921) (1909). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 18. 
 274. Id. (emphasis added). 
 275. Gray was one of Pound’s teachers when the latter attended Harvard Law School, 
and he made quite an impression on the young Pound. DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: 
PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 40–41 (1974); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 54 (1995). 
 276. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV 343 (1915). 
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included “personality interests” (an individual’s interest in “physical 
and spiritual existence”), “domestic interests” (those of an 
“expanded individual life”), and “interests of substance” (economic 
interests).277 The public interest referred to the “interests of the state 
as a juristic person” or sovereign, while social interests included the 
“interests of the community at large.”278 Pound did not deny the 
significance of individual interests and found there to be “much 
truth in the old theories of natural rights,” but he focused his 
attention primarily on the social interests law served to protect.279 
Why Pound stressed social interests above the others is an 
interesting question. Professor Graber is right to suggest that part of 
the reason no doubt lies in Pound’s disapproval of the contemporary 
judicial tendency to sanctify individual rights.280 In his essay entitled 
Liberty of Contract, Pound lamented “the currency in juristic 
thought of an individualist conception of justice, which exaggerates 
the importance of property and of contract, exaggerates private right 
at the expense of public right, and is hostile to legislation.”281 In 
Pound’s view, judges were neglecting the interests of the community 
in their single-minded focus on the enforcement of individual 
economic rights. 
But Pound also focused on social interests because he believed 
them to be essential to the nature of law itself. This was true in two 
senses. First, as an historical matter, Pound argued that all law had 
arisen to protect the most basic social interest of all: general security. 
“It is not too much to say,” Pound maintained, “that law came into 
being to secure this interest.”282 Laws that appeared to protect purely 
individual interests had in fact often arisen to protect social interests. 
For example, the first injuries Roman law recognized were physical 
injuries, but they were not seen as harms to the individual interest in 
bodily integrity. Instead, they threatened the “social interest in peace 
and good order,” which would be disturbed by vengeful acts from 
the assailed individual’s kinsman.283 Thus, once the individual 
interest was legally recognized, it was regarded as an interest in 
 
 277. Id. at 349. 
 278. Id. at 344. 
 279. Id. at 343. 
 280. GRABER, supra note 3, at 72. 
 281. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457 (1909). 
 282. Pound, supra note 276, at 345. 
 283. Id. at 356. 
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“honor, in one’s standing among brave men regardful of their 
honor, rather than as an interest in the integrity of the physical 
person.”284 In fact, the Latin term iniuria, which came to describe 
any injury to the person, originally meant “insult,” suggesting that 
legal rights served as remedies for affronts to honor in order to 
ensure social peace.285 This interpretation reflected one of the core 
assumptions of sociological jurisprudence—that law was best 
understood as a social institution and could therefore be analyzed as 
a “social science,” akin to economics or sociology.286 
Second, social interests were essential to law because they were 
an inherent component of judicial decisionmaking. Following 
Ihering’s view that all deliberative human action entailed the 
balancing of competing “picture[s],” Pound argued that judges 
balanced competing social visions.287 Although they claimed to be 
deducing outcomes from abstract principles, in fact such outcomes 
were “arrived at by an unconscious weighing of the competing 
claims.”288 Through this process, the content of a legal right was 
filled. Why must the judge balance social interests and not, for 
instance, the individual interests of the parties to the suit? Pound 
answered that individual interests did have to be weighed, and in 
most simple cases such weighing would be sufficient.289 But in 
difficult cases—especially ones of “first impression”—what usually 
did and should make the difference were the social interests 
implicated, because in such cases the individual interests were usually 
evenly balanced.290 The judge was then faced with effectively making 
new law and was forced to consider the policy consequences of his 
decision. 
 
 284. Id. at 357. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Function of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 516 (1912) (“[T]he sociological jurist pursues a comparative study of legal 
systems, legal doctrines, and legal institutions as social phenomena, and criticizes them with 
respect to their relation to social conditions and social progress.”). The connections between 
sociological jurisprudence and other social sciences are suggested by the name itself and have 
been well documented by other scholars. See, e.g., WIGDOR, supra note 275, at 213 
(mentioning that the sociologist Albion Small directly influenced Pound); Gardner, supra note 
251, at 5 (noting the sociologist Lester Ward’s influence on Pound).  
 287. VON IHERING, supra note 251, at 7–8; POUND, supra note 246, at 160. 
 288. POUND, supra note 246, at 160. 
 289. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1943). 
 290. Id. at 4. 
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This idea was hardly novel in the law, but it had traditionally 
gone under a different name: “The body of the common law is made 
up of adjustments or compromises of conflicting individual interests 
in which we turn to some social interest, frequently under the name 
of public policy, to determine the limits of a reasonable 
adjustment.”291 In other words, the term “social interests” was, in his 
view, just a new name for “public policy,” long recognized as a 
legitimate component of common law decisionmaking. According to 
Pound, then, the right of “due process of law” consisted in one’s 
right to have such decisionmaking proceed in a non-arbitrary way; 
that is, due process protected the individual’s second-order right to 
have his legal rights determined through an impartial “weighing or 
balancing of the various interests which overlap or come in conflict” 
as well as a “rational reconciling or adjustment” of them.292 Simply 
put, the content of legal rights was the result of interest-balancing. 
This view is not without theoretical difficulties. For one thing, 
Pound did not offer judges criteria to guide them in the process of 
weighing interests, and this fact ranks as a principal shortcoming of 
sociological jurisprudence. It is well to say that all rights derive from 
social interests, but without any explanation as to why some interests 
are legitimate for legal decisionmaking and others are not, it appears 
somewhat question-begging as a normative theory of adjudication. If 
judges may legitimately balance interests, will any old interest do? 
And how do we know the “weight” of the various interests? Indeed, 
can one even “weigh” competing interests that lack a common unit 
of measure?293 Furthermore, Pound’s faith in the ability of 
“experts”—whether judicial or administrative officials—to mete out 
justice in an entirely impartial and apolitical fashion appears naïve to 
us today, now that we are sensitive to the dangers of agency 
“capture” and other implications of public choice theory of 
bureaucratic behavior.294 
 
 291. Id. (emphasis added). 
 292. Id. 
 293. See Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 813, 815–18 (1994) (discussing different types of incommensurability and the 
philosophical difficulties associated with each of them). 
 294. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of 
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827 (applying public choice theory to the conduct of 
judges in the American constitutional system). 
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Nevertheless, this brief survey of the work of Ihering, Gray, and 
Pound has sought to show that, despite its theoretical shortcomings, 
sociological jurisprudence was a philosophy of law insofar as it 
offered an account of the nature of legal rights and a theory of 
adjudication. Specifically, under this view, (1) legal rights were 
justified by reference to public policy or “social interests,” (2) such 
rights were essentially instrumental conceptions designed to serve 
such interests, and (3) legal disputes were properly resolved by the 
weighing or balancing of competing interests. Each of these features 
figured prominently in Chafee’s theory of free speech. 
B. Freedom of Speech and Defamation 
The second step in showing why Chafee’s reliance on the 
principles of sociological jurisprudence reveal his theory to be 
traditional rather than novel is to show how those principles were 
embodied in the long-established protections of free speech at 
common law. Recall that in his famous article, Chafee referred to 
“the subsequent development of the law of fair comment in civil 
defamation” as one of the primary sources of the “constitutional 
conception of free speech.”295 Chafee also singled out the law of 
“privilege and fair comment” as a notable exception to his general 
indictment of recent case law on free speech as being decided 
“largely by intuition,” suggesting he found more principled 
decisionmaking governing in those areas.296 These references should 
not be surprising since defamation law was the main area in which 
conflicts over permissible and impermissible speech arose and was 
one of Chafee’s principal areas of expertise.297 Chafee saw that the 
structure and function of the various privileges in defamation law 
seemed to reflect the core tenets of sociological jurisprudence. 
Specifically, the qualified privileges in libel law served public, 
democratic functions; they were viewed as instrumentally necessary 
for achieving those purposes; and determining their meaning and 
scope of application required balancing individual and social 
interests. 
 
 295. Chafee, supra note 6, at 955. 
 296. Id. at 945. 
 297. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919–1920: Equitable Relief 
Against Torts, 34 HARV. L. REV. 388, 408 (1921). 
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1. Public purposes 
As we saw in Part III, contrary to the revisionists’ allegations, 
almost all of the conservative libertarians who addressed the issue of 
free speech defended it on public grounds. Thomas Cooley in 
particular advocated an expansive qualified privilege for criticism of 
public officials, which was only one among many such privileges he 
viewed as necessary to secure the public interest in free discussion.298 
Cooley said the First Amendment protected a “sacred right” that is 
“essential to the existence and perpetuity of free government.”299 
The state and federal constitutions protecting freedom of speech “do 
not create new rights” but instead “protect the citizen in the 
enjoyment of those already possessed.”300 Yet Cooley did not look to 
natural rights to justify such constitutional protections; rather, “[w]e 
are at once . . . turned back from these provisions to the common 
law, in order that we may ascertain what the rights are which are thus 
protected.”301 
For Cooley, the common law meaning of freedom of speech 
consisted in nothing more and nothing less than a series of legitimate 
defenses, or “privileges,” in common law defamation actions. He 
devoted most of the chapter entitled “Liberty of Speech and of the 
Press” in his constitutional treatise to the following topics: “Libels 
upon the Government,” “Criticism upon Officers and Candidates for 
Office” (qualified privilege), “Statements in the Course of Judicial 
Proceedings,” “Privilege of Counsel,” “Privilege of Legislators,” 
“Privileges of Publishers of News,” “The Jury as Judges of the Law” 
(a traditional procedural requirement to aid the defendant), and 
finally “Good Motives and Justifiable Ends” (a limiting element of 
defenses in libel actions found in the text of many state 
constitutional provisions on free speech).302 We no longer typically 
think of the attorney-client privilege as primarily a protection of free 
speech, but Cooley clearly stated the criterion for its inclusion. He 
explained that he would only concern himself “with those special 
cases where, for some reason of general public policy, the publication is 
 
 298. COOLEY, supra note 76, at 414. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 416–17. 
 301. Id. at 417. 
 302. Id. at 425–64. 
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claimed to be privileged, and where, consequently, it may be 
supposed to be within the constitutional protection.”303 
 Not surprisingly, Cooley rejected the Blackstonian conception of 
free speech for similar reasons.304 Professor Graber cites Cooley’s 
repudiation of the Blackstonian view as evidence of his conservative 
libertarian credentials,305 but he neglects to mention Cooley’s 
justification for speech privileges mentioned in the very next 
paragraph. “[T]heir purpose,” Cooley noted, “has evidently been to 
protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to 
secure their right to free discussion of public events and public 
measures.”306 In his treatise on torts, Cooley was even more direct: 
The freedom of the press was undoubtedly intended to be secured 
on public grounds, and the general purpose may be said to be, to 
preclude those in authority from making use of the machinery of 
the law to prevent full discussion of political and other matters in 
which the public are concerned.307  
It would be difficult to find a more explicit statement that the 
constitutional protections of free speech grow out of public, 
democratic values. 
Chafee not only endorsed Cooley’s criticism of the Blackstonian 
view,308 but he also looked to more recent discussions of defamation 
privileges. In noting the influence of the law of fair comment on the 
meaning of the First Amendment, Chafee cited an article by Judge 
Van Vechten Veeder, entitled “Freedom of Public Discussion.”309 In 
that article, Veeder noted that “[t]he process of continual 
readjustment between the needs of society and the protection of 
individual rights is nowhere more conspicuous than in the history of 
the law of defamation.”310 Once again, here the “needs of society” 
 
 303. Id. (emphasis added). 
 304. Id. at 421. 
 305. GRABER, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 306. COOLEY, supra note 76, at 421–22 (emphasis added). 
 307. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH 
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 256 (2d ed. 1888) (emphasis added). 
 308. See supra Part II. 
 309. Chafee, supra note 6, at 955. 
 310. Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413, 413 
(1910). 
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referred to the value of open discussion, whereas the protection of 
individual rights meant the individual’s right to reputation.311 
Veeder’s analysis of defamation privileges did not differ 
significantly from Cooley’s, even though Cooley wrote during an era 
of legal formalism while Veeder wrote at the height of the 
Progressive era. Veeder endorsed Cooley’s qualified privilege for false 
statements about public officials made in good faith and cited 
Cooley in support of his refusal to limit such a privilege to comments 
made about the officer’s public conduct.312 Veeder acknowledged 
that “this view has not met with universal acceptance,” but he 
insisted that “the fundamental error of any other doctrine consists in 
the assumption that the private character of a public officer is 
something aside from, and not entering into or influencing, his 
public conduct.”313 Just as Cooley had before him, then, Veeder 
determined the proper scope of privileged communications by 
reference to their relevance to democratic decisionmaking.314 
2. Instrumentalism 
Following Gray, Ihering, and Pound, Chafee understood legal 
rights to be only instrumentally valuable to the protection of human 
interests. He emphasized that the distinction between rights and 
interests “clarifies almost any constitutional controversy.”315 This was 
particularly true in defamation law, where the scope and limits of 
privileges clearly betrayed their functional rationale. For example, we 
saw in Part III that despite Professor Graber’s claims to the contrary, 
Christopher Tiedeman was not a vigorous defender of free speech—
at least not on the grounds of an individual’s natural rights.316 
Interestingly though, Tiedeman did see one defamation privilege as 
 
 311. Id. at 414. 
 312. Id. at 430. 
 313. Id. 
 314. This point requires some qualification. That Veeder and Chafee agreed with Cooley 
in seeing free speech as necessary for self-government does not imply that their conceptions of 
democracy were the same. It may be that Cooley’s view reflected a republican concern with the 
corruption of political officials while Chafee thought free speech was necessary to legitimize 
majority rule. See White, supra note 21, at 526 (distinguishing these views and noting the 
republican distrust of mass democracy). Still, the point is to contrast both of these positions 
with the libertarian view described by the revisionists, namely that freedom of speech protected 
an individual’s “sphere of . . . mental conduct.” GRABER, supra note 3, at 19. 
 315. Chafee, supra note 6, at 957. 
 316. See supra Part II. 
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protecting an individual interest. In explaining the rationale behind 
the privilege for impartial accounts of legal proceedings, he pointed 
out that “the law favors the greatest amount of publicity in legal 
proceedings, it being one of the political tenets prevailing in this 
country, that such publicity is a strong guaranty of personal 
liberty.”317 Thus, an individual interest was served by the 
constitutional protection of free speech, but only in a derivative, 
instrumental sense: the parties’ right to a fair and impartial trial was 
functionally protected by the publicity to which all the trial’s 
actors—judges, lawyers, and witnesses—were exposed. 
Another example from Tiedeman’s work reveals even more 
clearly how functional concerns drove the complex system of speech 
privileges. In limiting the qualified privilege for criticism of public 
officers, Tiedeman drew a distinction between unelected public 
officers removable only for cause and those removable at the 
discretion of an elected official: 
[W]here the office is one, the incumbent of which can only be 
removed for malfeasance in office, only those communications 
should be held to be privileged, which criticise [sic] his public 
conduct. If, however, the office is appointive, and the incumbent is 
removable at the pleasure of the appointive power, the privilege 
should be as extensive as that which should relate to candidates.318 
Tiedeman appears to be suggesting that speech ought to be 
protected only insofar as the public’s awareness of it could have a 
practical effect on the officer’s job security. He defined the scope of 
the privilege to speak freely, in other words, exclusively by reference 
to its likely consequences. Thus, even the formalist Christopher 
Tiedeman protected speech not because it protected a sacred sphere 
but because it had instrumental value in ensuring the proper 
functioning of representative self-government. This is not to deny 
that sociological jurisprudence was novel insofar as it conceived of 
law entirely in functional terms, but it does suggest that the elaborate 
system of privileges in defamation law provided sociological jurists 
like Chafee with good evidence to support such a view.319 
 
 317. TIEDEMAN, supra note 86, at 64. 
 318. Id. at 56. 
 319. For an interesting present-day functional analysis of the impact of the First 
Amendment on defamation law, see Michael Passaportis, A Law and Norms Critique of the 
Constitutional Law of Defamation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1985 (2004). 
BARZUN.MRO.DOC 4/5/2007 11:15:10 AM 
259] Social Interest in Free Speech 
 315 
3. Interest balancing 
Finally, Chafee found in defamation law the third notable feature 
of sociological jurisprudence, namely the balancing of interests. 
“Unlimited discussion,” Chafee maintained, sometimes interferes 
with other important government objectives.320 When that occurs, 
such purposes “must then be balanced against freedom of speech, 
but freedom of speech ought to weigh heavily in the scale.”321 Such 
balancing analysis closely mirrors that required in defamation law 
where, Veeder explained, “the existence and extent of the [fair 
comment] privilege is determined by balancing the needs of society 
with the right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation.”322 
Indeed, when Roscoe Pound sought to elucidate the meaning of a 
legal “privilege,” he looked to defamation law as an example: 
What would ordinarily be actionable as a libel because of its effect 
upon the reputation of the subject of the writing may be privileged 
and hence involve no liability when written in honest criticism of 
the official acts of a public officer, since the public interest in free 
criticism in such a case outweighs the individual interest.323 
Such balancing was hardly an innovation of sociological jurists. 
In a concurring opinion he wrote while serving as a justice on the 
Michigan Supreme Court, Cooley was candid about how one must 
decide libel cases in which the defendant asserted privilege as a 
defense. “The difficult problem in the law of libel,” Cooley began, 
“is how to reconcile privilege with a proper protection of the rights 
of the individual. Privilege in the law of libel implies some liberty of 
discussion and publication, and protection therein even though the 
discussion proves to be mistaken.”324 Because “the public benefits of 
free discussion” are often considerable, the law refuses to impose 
liability in such cases despite the real harm that the plaintiff suffers.325 
“But there are other cases,” Cooley explained, “where the public 
benefits of free discussion may be equaled or overbalanced by public 
evils.”326 In such cases, “the privilege might cause private injuries 
 
 320. Chafee, supra note 6, at 957. 
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 322. Veeder, supra note 310, at 414. 
 323. Roscoe Pound, Legal Rights, 26 INT’L J. ETHICS 92, 99 (1915) (emphasis added). 
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without any compensating public benefits except such as are offset 
by public evils.”327 In this case, because he found insufficient the 
public benefits from the defendant newspaper’s speech, Cooley 
denied it protection.328 Thus, Cooley not only balanced public and 
private values, but also balanced public values against each other in 
order to determine the proper assignment of a legal right.329 
Cooley was not unique in this regard. In Post Publishing Co. v. 
Hallam, then-Judge William Howard Taft upheld a plaintiff-
politician’s libel suit against a newspaper that had run stories 
accusing the politician of accepting bribes.330 In rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that his speech was protected by a qualified 
privilege to make statements in the good faith belief in their truth, 
Judge Taft declared, 
The existence and extent of privilege in communications are 
determined by balancing the needs and good of society against the 
right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation when he has done 
nothing which ought to injure it. The privilege should always cease 
where the sacrifice of the individual right becomes so great that the 
public good to be derived from it is outweighed.331 
Taft was not one to be easily mistaken for a sociological jurist, but 
here we see him adjusting the scope of protection granted to certain 
forms of speech by balancing the interests of society in open 
discussion against the individual interest in reputation. This view was 
elaborated in other decisions of the time as well.332 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. This is not to deny that the use of balancing analysis in constitutional jurisprudence 
was somewhat new. Professor Aleinikoff points out that while it is impossible to know for sure 
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may simply indicate that in the area of defamation law jurists were more inclined to do so than 
in other areas. 
 330. Post Publ’g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 531, 542 (6th Cir. 1893). 
 331. Id. at 540. 
 332. See, e.g., Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend’s Adm’x, 21 Fla. 431, 457–58 (1885) 
(“[I]t is said that a fair account of proceedings not ex parte in a court of justice is privileged, 
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the convenience of publicity.”); see also Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 98 F. 222, 233 (6th 
Cir. 1899) (citing with approval the passage quoted above from Post Publishing Co.). 
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No wonder, then, that Chafee did not see as revolutionary his 
proposal that social and individual interests of free speech “must be 
balanced against each other” in order to define the meaning of the 
First Amendment.333 He saw in defamation law doctrinal evidence of 
precisely those features that Pound and Gray had argued were 
essential to law itself. This fact suggests that the ideological appeal of 
a theory of free speech based on “social interest” was not necessary 
for its development. Rather, the traditional legal defenses to libel 
actions provided Chafee with the answers he sought in his effort to 
discover the “nature and scope of the policy” of the First 
Amendment.334 
C. Chafee and the First Amendment 
I have been arguing that Chafee articulated a defense of free 
speech based on the democratic value of free and open discussion on 
public matters because he believed it to be the traditional 
justification for free speech protections found in defamation law. It 
may be objected that even if that is true, Chafee’s argument, while 
perhaps sufficient as a defense to private libel suits, fails to justify 
striking down an act of Congress infringing free speech. After all, 
Progressives typically called for deference to legislative judgments 
precisely because representatives of the people were considered to be 
the best judge of what constitutes a “social interest.” Insofar as 
Chafee sought to make a constitutional argument, then, his theory 
entailed a profound change in First Amendment theory. 
The first response is to note that Chafee’s goal in “Freedom of 
Speech in Wartime” was not to justify judicial review of legislation. 
Professor G. Edward White has correctly pointed out that the project 
of rationalizing the Court’s simultaneous deference to legislatures in 
the economic realm and its refusal to do so in freedom of speech 
cases “occupied the Court from the 1920s through the 1940s.”335 
Even so, Chafee wrote his article before even one act of Congress 
was struck down on the basis of the First Amendment, so it may be 
anachronistic to interpret him as preemptively trying to resolve the 
 
 333. Chafee, supra note 6, at 957. 
 334. Id. at 935. 
 335. White, supra note 21, at 533. 
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so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty.336 Indeed, in his 1919 
article, Chafee instructed judges how to interpret the Espionage Act, 
not strike it down; he even suggested Congress could constitutionally 
limit speech if it so desired. “The Espionage Act,” he maintained, 
“should not be construed to reverse this national policy of liberty of 
the press and silence hostile criticism, unless Congress has given the 
clearest expression of such intention in the statute.”337 
Furthermore, insofar as Chafee did invoke his theory to justify 
striking down acts of legislatures, we ought not let our own 
jurisprudential assumptions cloud our interpretation of his writing. 
Today, many are prone to see all law as inherently political, so that 
any legal argument appears to mask some independent ideological 
goal. That was not the view of Chafee and other Progressive 
intellectuals. To be sure, one of the central tenets of sociological 
jurisprudence, as we have seen, was a rejection of the view that law 
had an essential existence outside of human agency. But Pound and 
Chafee did not infer from this observation, as later scholars would, 
that there was therefore no rational standard by which to choose 
among competing human interests or goals. Rather, they believed a 
true and objective common good existed and that it could be 
discerned through careful study and observation. Thus, in grounding 
his legal arguments in the public policies or “social interests” at 
stake, Chafee sought not to revolutionize the law of free speech, but 
rather to reinforce its foundation. 
VI. NORMATIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
What, it may fairly be asked, does any of this matter today? My 
hope is that this Article makes a contribution on three levels: 
historical, normative, and methodological. First, there is value in 
setting the record straight as an historical matter. First Amendment 
historians have embraced the idea that there existed a conservative 
libertarian tradition in spite of the relative dearth of evidence 
supporting it. Professor Rabban, for instance, has argued that Chafee 
and other Progressives “developed a conception of free speech that 
 
 336. The counter-majoritarian difficulty refers to the idea that the doctrine of judicial 
review is fundamentally anti-democratic. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 337. Chafee, supra note 6, at 962 (emphasis added). 
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differed significantly from defenses that prevailed before the war.”338 
Professor White similarly has written that Chafee “discarded the 
legacy of earlier libertarian speech theorists by treating their work as 
largely invisible.”339 I hope the foregoing account has shown that 
that this view is seriously misleading. This is not to say that there is 
no evidence of libertarian defenses in these years. Some political 
radicals, such as Theodore Schroeder, did indeed advocate expansive 
conceptions of free speech based on individual autonomy, as 
Professor Rabban has shown.340 But the point I have stressed is that 
the laissez-faire constitutionalism epitomized by Lochner,341 did not 
entail, either in theory or practice, a comparable dedication to 
protecting free speech. Indeed, in certain legal contexts, such as the 
labor injunction cases, we have seen that just the opposite was true. 
But the argument also has normative bite. For if Professor 
Graber is right that Chafee’s theory was “a product of the peculiar 
intellectual conditions of [the Progressives’] times, not a position 
inherent in either liberalism or the constitutional history of the 
United States,”342 one might expect that it would only be true or 
useful under such conditions. Indeed, this is precisely the conclusion 
Graber draws. Under the democratic view, the paradigmatic purpose 
of the First Amendment is to prevent government suppression of 
dissident political speech, but Graber notes that, writing in 1991, 
“there has been little significant repression of this sort over the past 
twenty years.”343 Thus, in discussing Professor Vincent Blasi’s 
“pathological perspective” of the First Amendment, which sees it as 
primarily concerned with governmental censorship of speech,344 
Graber accuses Blasi of “sacrific[ing] solutions to contemporary 
threats to expression in order to develop doctrine that is more 
responsive to past problems.”345 In today’s world, Graber contends, 
 
 338. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 4. 
 339. White, supra note 5, at 316; see also Gordon, supra note 5, at 386 (“Mark Graber 
has convincingly argued that to ‘conservative libertarians’ of the late nineteenth century, free 
speech was conceptually on a par with contractual liberty as a core liberty to be protected 
against the state—that is, it was an integral piece of the social sphere.”). 
 340. See SCHROEDER, supra note 105. 
 341. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 342. GRABER, supra note 3, at 216. 
 343. Id. at 13. 
 344. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449 (1985). 
 345. GRABER, supra note 3, at 201. 
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“[T]he most important First Amendment issues facing American 
society concern the ways that disparities in economic resources affect 
access to the marketplace of ideas.”346 
If, however, the democratic, instrumentalist theory of free speech 
has roots older than Chafee, and if it derives from legal principles 
unrelated to Progressive politics, we might expect it to be relevant 
even in periods when the “peculiar intellectual conditions” of that 
time do not pertain. And recent evidence suggests this may be the 
case. Although Graber’s relative unconcern with government 
suppression of political speech may have been warranted in the early 
1990s when Graber was writing, it no longer seems to be. Indeed, 
the Government’s recent efforts to mute political dissent and tightly 
monitor information related to its “War on Terror” and the actual 
war in Iraq have been the source of much legal and political 
controversy. Examples include the President’s use of “free speech 
zones” to keep protestors at a distance during his public speeches;347
 
the Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the Internet 
posting of the names of the Republican delegates by critics of the 
Administration prior to the 2004 Republican convention;348 the 
FBI’s collecting of thousands of pages of files on political groups 
critical of the Administration, such as the ACLU and Greenpeace;349 
and the Justice Department’s efforts to force journalists to reveal 
their confidential sources or their phone records used in connection 
with such sources.350 Finally, the Bush Administration is even 
reported to be considering prosecuting journalists themselves for 
violating the very same Espionage Act that prompted Chafee to write 
his 1919 article, a move which would be virtually unprecedented in 
our nation’s history.351 
 
 346. Id. at 13. 
 347. Dahlia Lithwick, Tyranny in the Name of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2004, at 
A25. 
 348. Eric Lichtblau, Subpoena Seeks Records About Delegate Lists on Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2004, at P10. 
 349. Eric Lichtblau, Large Volume of F.B.I. Files Alarms U.S. Activist Groups, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2005, at A12. 
 350. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 181 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sack, J., 
dissenting) (noting that a qualified privilege protecting journalists from revealing their sources 
“is an integral part of the way in which the American public is kept informed and therefore of 
the American democratic process”). 
 351. Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 
22, 2006, at A4. The 1917 Espionage Act provides in relevant part that one who “lawfully 
having possession of, access to, . . . any document, writing, . . . or note relating to the national 
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This is not to deny that one could justify striking down some of 
these governmental actions on autonomy grounds. Surely one 
could.352 But the Administration’s actions do suggest that what are 
considered paradigmatic threats to free speech under the democratic 
view may not be relics of the past. This fact constitutes further 
evidence that the “social interest” in free speech Chafee identified 
was grounded on an enduring legal principle, not merely on an 
ephemeral political ideology. 
Which leads to the final, methodological point. This Article has 
been motivated less by a desire to defend a particular conception of 
free speech than by a desire to offer a certain view of history. 
Although I have used Professor Graber’s work as a foil for my own 
historical account of the First Amendment, I have done so in part 
because I share his conviction that history is directly relevant to 
normative legal theory. For if he is right that Chafee’s theory of free 
speech was an ad hoc, politically expedient response to unique 
historical circumstances no longer relevant to us, that fact should 
indeed prompt us to scrutinize it carefully to ensure there remain 
good reasons for our present adherence to it. 
But if my view is correct, does not the opposite conclusion 
follow? That is, if Chafee’s view of free speech is older and on firmer 
legal ground than has been recently thought, surely that should 
count as a reason to take it all the more seriously. The theory’s 
endurance over time may be evidence of its success at coping with 
certain fundamental features of political life—in this case, the 
inevitable desire of those in power to shield themselves from public 
criticism. And this need not be true for metaphysical reasons. Even if 
a legal or political theory is not “timeless” or true a priori, its success 
over time may nonetheless be sufficient to justify according it a 
certain amount of respect on that basis. In this way, history is directly 
relevant to current normative debates. 
 
defense,” and who “has reason to believe [it] could be used to the injury of the United States 
. . . [and] willfully communicates, delivers, transmits . . . to any person not entitled to receive 
it” may be punished for up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2000); see also Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Scared of Scoops, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2006, at A21. 
 352. But it is difficult to see how it would justify the reporter’s privilege where autonomy 
concerns seem almost entirely absent. Indeed, few have sympathy for investigative journalists 
who claim a right to the “privacy” of their sources given that most earn their livelihood by 
making public that which other people seek to keep private. 
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Against this conclusion, a couple of methodological objections 
might be leveled. First, one might object that I have misinterpreted 
Chafee’s theory by stripping it out of its historical context. One 
might argue, in other words, that my interpretation is necessarily 
misleading insofar as it takes Chafee’s words at face value and seeks 
only to understand what he said, not why he said it. In this vein, 
Professor Quentin Skinner, whose historical method Graber 
endorses, has suggested that one can only explain an historical text if 
one uncovers what Skinner calls its “illocutionary force,” a concept 
he borrows from the philosopher J.L. Austin.353 Professor Skinner 
distinguishes the force of a text from its meaning; whereas the latter 
refers to what the author intended to say in uttering certain words, 
and the former refers to what he or she intended to do by uttering 
such words—e.g., to issue a warning, to make a promise, or to tell a 
joke.354 In order to discover the “force” of the text, Professor 
Skinner explains, the historian must be aware of the linguistic and 
ideological context in which the author wrote, for only by learning 
how the author was constrained by the rhetorical conventions of his 
time may we come to understand how he or she sought to conform 
to, revise, or challenge such conventions.355 
How this view applies to my interpretation of Chafee is not hard 
to see. Graber cites Skinner in arguing that Chafee was constrained 
by certain “legitimate first premises” of political argument in the 
Progressive era, namely that any such argument had to be framed in 
terms of the “social interests” implicated.356 Thus, insofar as my 
assertion of Chafee’s relevance today requires ignoring the 
ideological constraints he faced at the time he wrote, Graber or 
Skinner might argue that I misinterpret Chafee’s writing. 
But whether or not the concept of “illocutionary force”357 is 
useful for the interpretation of historical texts as a general matter 
(something about which I harbor some doubt), it is sufficient to 
 
 353. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING 
& CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 29, 61 (James Tully ed., 1988) (citing J.L. 
AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962)). For Graber’s endorsement of Skinner’s 
approach, see GRABER, supra note 3, at 10. 
 354. Skinner, supra note 353. 
 355. Id. at 62–63. 
 356. GRABER, supra note 3, at 10. 
 357. For an insightful critique of Skinner’s use of the concept, see Keith Graham, How 
Do Illocutionary Descriptions Explain?, in MEANING & CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND 
HIS CRITICS, supra note 353, at 147–56. 
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note that in this case its invocation simply begs the central historical 
question as to what Chafee was up to. I have argued that in 
formulating his theory of free speech in the way he did, Chafee was 
acting as a legal scholar rather than a political advocate, as Graber 
contends. I could have equally said that the “illocutionary force” of 
his 1919 article was to use existing conventions of legal discourse 
(e.g., reliance upon precedent and use of analogical reasoning) to 
expound what he believed was the best interpretation of the First 
Amendment. However framed, though, the issue remains 
unchanged: the point of contention between Graber and myself is 
whether Chafee’s writing is better explained by a Progressive political 
ideology or by traditional legal principles. If my historical account is 
more accurate—and if we have reason to believe those legal 
principles have continuing relevance today—then, as stated earlier, 
my insistence upon Chafee’s present-day relevance is justified. By the 
same token, if my interpretation is flawed, then the normative 
conclusions I draw are misplaced. Regardless, though, the point is 
that this objection is ultimately an historical one, not a philosophical 
or methodological one. 
Second, one may argue that even if I correctly interpret Chafee’s 
own work accurately, in my effort to find continuity between his 
work and that of earlier scholars, such as Thomas Cooley, I obscure 
important differences. Professor White, for instance, notes that 
republican political theory tended to be suspicious of mass 
democracy, whereas the Progressives embraced it.358 Cooley’s 
advocacy of expansive speech privileges may have thus reflected the 
traditional republican concern with the corruption of legislative 
representatives, which grows out of a political theory not only 
different from, but in many ways hostile to, Chafee’s Progressive 
view that the “discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general 
concern” would enable popular majorities to guide public policy.359 
This objection finds theoretical support in Thomas Kuhn’s 
famous notion of “paradigms.” According to Kuhn, progress in the 
natural sciences does not proceed in a steady, linear fashion, but 
instead consists of long periods of “normal science,” followed by 
radical breaks or “revolutions,” in which the natural phenomena 
 
 358. See White, supra note 21, at 526. 
 359. Chafee, supra note 6, at 956–57. I thank Professor White for making this distinction 
clear to me in personal correspondence. 
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under study is reinterpreted within a new “paradigm.”360 According 
to Kuhn, these paradigms so deeply affect how scientists view the 
world that one may fairly say that those working in different 
paradigms “in some sense live in different worlds.”361 Although 
Kuhn himself attributed this developmental pattern to certain 
sociological features of scientific communities that are absent in 
other fields such as medicine and law, and even doubted whether the 
social sciences had yet acquired a dominant paradigm,362 his 
historical method has been extremely influential outside the history 
of science, including in the fields of constitutional history and 
theory.363 The objection could thus be recast as denying that Chafee 
and Cooley could have had similar understandings of the First 
Amendment since their underlying conceptual frameworks placed 
them in completely different jurisprudential worlds. 
But while there may indeed be important differences between 
the jurisprudential assumptions of Chafee and Cooley, there are also 
similarities: both assumed that government derived its legitimacy 
from the consent of the governed, both regarded the protection of 
liberty and property as one of the primary duties of government, and 
both believed that efforts to stifle criticism of officials threatened to 
limit the ability of the government to reflect the will of the people—
even if they may have differed as to whether such a “will” was best 
expressed through pure electoral majorities or through some form of 
enlightened representation. This last similarity may reflect a further 
shared assumption, namely that the governed were, on balance, 
sufficiently rational to distinguish between true and false ideas in 
public affairs. 
Of course, one can certainly argue that the differences between 
the two theorists were deeper or more significant than the similarities 
for the purposes of understanding their views on the First 
Amendment, but doing so requires historical argument. That is, it 
 
 360. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–22 (2d ed. 
1970) [hereinafter KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS]. Kuhn later reformulated this concept 
as a “disciplinary matrix.” See THOMAS S. KUHN, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE 
ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 297 
(1977). 
 361. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 360, at 193 (emphasis omitted). 
 362. Id. at 15, 19. 
 363. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional 
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1598–99 
(1982). 
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requires interpreting their texts in light of what we know about the 
time in which they lived and based on plausible assumptions about 
human motivation in general. Such an argument may in fact reveal a 
radical disjuncture between Chafee’s and Cooley’s worldviews—or 
between Chafee’s and our own—but again there is no a priori reason 
to assume at the outset that it will do so. Quite the opposite, in this 
Article, I have argued that although Chafee clearly articulated his 
theory using the dominant jurisprudential concepts of his day, he 
discovered its core features in the traditional justifications for 
protecting free speech at common law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Revisionist historians of modern free speech theory have 
contributed much to our understanding of the First Amendment. 
They have demonstrated well that it was not just the Framers who 
valued free speech and that the intellectual history of the First 
Amendment is not as monolithic as previously considered. Yet the 
revisionist account itself requires revision, because it has exaggerated 
the extent to which freedom of speech was defended by nineteenth-
century libertarians as a form of property right, and, in so doing, it 
has somewhat mischaracterized the history of the modern 
democratic view of free speech and neglected its intellectual roots in 
the common law. Chafee did not argue that the First Amendment 
protected a “social interest” in free speech merely because it was 
politically expedient; he did so because he understood it to have 
been long protected for that reason in the private law of defamation. 
That he framed his theory in the language of sociological 
jurisprudence does not constitute evidence to the contrary; it 
suggests only that Chafee thought he could gain insight into the 
present through philosophical analysis of legal sources from the past. 
On that issue, he may even have been right. 
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